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The greatest productive asset for most people in the world is their own labor.
Many poor people employ their labor in subsistence agriculture or in informal
jobs. A direct route to lift these people out of poverty is to move them into
formal sector jobs which provide higher wages and more benefits. It is also
important for poverty alleviation to improve the wages and benefits provided
to people already working in formal sector jobs. The more people that can be
employed in formal sectors jobs with higher wages, the fewer people there will
be living in poverty. My research deals with issues in this arena.
The first chapter investigates whether firms behave monopsonistically,
which would result in lower wages and lower employment than a competitive
outcome would. The results show that about 60% of the manufacturing firms do
behave monopsonistically in the labor market. The second chapter analyzes the
impact of increased firing restrictions on the behavior of firms, and finds that
labor costs increase, output decreases, and the capital-labor ratio increases. The
third chapter looks how big of an impact the monopsonistic behavior of firms
has on the poverty rate in Indonesia, and finds that poverty would be 8.5% to
23% lower if firms behaved competitively in the labor market.
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CHAPTER 1
VARIATION IN MONOPSONISTIC BEHAVIOR ACROSS
ESTABLISHMENTS: EVIDENCE FROM THE INDONESIAN LABOR
MARKET
1.1 Introduction
How much market power do individual firms1 have in their labor market, and is
that power more attributable to specific firm characteristics or the labor market
the firm participates in? Monopsony has traditionally been considered a mar-
ket characteristic where individual firms face the upward-sloping labor supply
curve of the market (Robinson 1933). However, recent theoretical work has
shown that individual firms can have market power above and beyond the
level of monopsony determined by the market (Burdett and Mortensen 1998,
Manning 2003). Yet, standard empirical techniques for measuring monopsony
operate at an aggregate level, preventing analysis of the market power of in-
dividual firms. I propose a new method for measuring market power at the
firm-year level, which enables me to investigate the relative importance of firm
and market-level characteristics in determining market power.
This paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, I extend and
combine existing empirical techniques to develop a new method for measuring
market power that yields firm-year specific measurements. Second, I apply this
method to Indonesia, providing to my knowledge, the first evidence for monop-
sonistic behavior of firms in an emerging economy. Lastly, I use the distribution
1The following empirical analysis deals with establishments that may or may not be a part
of a larger corporation, but I will use the terms firm and establishment interchangeably.
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of market power across firms to show that individual firm characteristics are
more important in explaining a firm’s market power than is the labor market
the firm participates in.
A standard empirical measure of monopsony2 is the difference between a
worker’s marginal revenue product and the wage he or she is paid, normal-
ized by the wage (Pigou 1924)3. The inverse of this measure is the elasticity of
the labor supply curve facing the firm. With one exception, the existing evi-
dence on monopsony is at an aggregate level (Sullivan 1989; Boal and Ransom
1997; Staiger, Spetz and Phibbs 2010; Hirsch, Schank and Schnabel 2010; Falch
2010; Ransom and Sims 2010). The one exception is Ransom and Oaxaca (2010),
whose data are from only one grocery store chain, so that their estimate is for
the monopsony power of that one firm4.
In contrast, I build a method for calculating this measure of market power
at the firm-year level. Using a panel of manufacturing establishments in In-
donesia, I calculate the marginal revenue product of firms directly by evaluat-
ing the derivative of the firm’s production function at their observed level of
inputs. I then compare the marginal revenue product of labor to the wage each
firm pays its workers to construct Pigou’s measure of monopsonistic behavior.
This direct approach for measuring monopsony has been used before, most no-
tably in the labor market for professional baseball players (Scully 1974; Medoff
1976; Zimbalist 1992; Boal and Ransom 1997). However, this setting requires
strong assumptions about how player productivity is linked to team revenue,
2A true monopsony has only one buyer of a good, but I follow the recent literature and
consider that term synonymous with monopsonistic competition, upward sloping labor supply
curve to the firm, and labor market power (Manning 2003).
3This measure is similar to the Lerner Index used to measure product market power.
4A recent working paper by Webber (2011) has estimated firm specific labor supply elastici-
ties using the US Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics data set.
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and is not very representative of the general workforce. Earlier literature has
also taken a similar approach to measuring labor market power, however the
empirical work was either done for the US as a whole over time (Thurow 1968;
Persky and Tsang 1974), or in a cross-section using only a handful of data points
from major industry categories (Hildebrand and Liu 1965). The agricultural eco-
nomics literature also directly compares the marginal revenue product of labor
to wages, though estimating the productivity of workers on farms (Feder 1985;
Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986; Barrett et al 2008).
I build on these literatures by leveraging the rich literature that has emerged
on how to reliably estimate production functions for firms (Olley and Pakes
1996; Blundell and Bond 1998, 2000; Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer 2006)5. Using
Blundell and Bond’s ‘System GMM’ estimator for reasons discussed in more
detail below, I am able to consistently estimate each firm’s marginal revenue
product of labor, which I then use to construct a firm-year specific measurement
of market power.
After estimating the firm-year mark-down on wages, I provide evidence that
this is indeed a measure of monopsony. I first test whether the measure is con-
sistent with the traditional view of monopsony, that firms in highly concen-
trated labor markets have more market power than firms in less concentrated
markets. Similarly, I test if firms with a higher share of employment in the lo-
cal labor market have higher levels of market power. I also consider various
alternative explanations, such as monopolistic exploitation, compensating dif-
ferentials, and efficiency wages. While I can not prove that my measured gaps
are solely due to labor market power, I argue that the measure is consistent with
monopsonistic behavior.
5Van Biesebroeck (2007) provides a useful summary of the various techniques.
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Indonesia is a good setting to look for evidence of monopsonistic behavior,
because the labor market frictions that lead to market power are more likely to
occur there than in a developed country. The traditional basis for monopsonistic
behavior is the existence of moving costs between labor markets. Indonesia has
over 13,000 islands with many geographic and cultural barriers between them
that make it difficult for workers to look for employment in another labor mar-
ket. The more recent theories of monopsony are also based on frictions that are
more prevalent in Indonesia (and many emerging economies). The search fric-
tions underlying Burdett and Mortensen’s model (1998) are based on imperfect
information across workers and firms, and I do not think its too strong of an
assumption that information flows less freely in developing countries. Another
source of monopsony is firm differentiation which leads to different workers
preferring to work for different types of firms. The difference in working envi-
ronments between the large and small firms in Indonesia is significant because
there are not as many standards the small firms need to comply with as there
are in developed countries. There are also many types of firm owners that sep-
arate the labor market in Indonesia. Employees likely have preferences over
working for a foreign owned firm or a domestic firm, and within each category
there would be differences between US, Dutch, and Chinese foreign ownership,
and between Javanese, Balinese, Chinese domestic ownership. Finally, one of
the assumptions of the Burdett and Mortensen model is that firms have increas-
ing recruiting costs (Kuhn 2004). While this may not be a natural assumption in
a developed country context, it is likely more prevalent in Indonesia as grow-
ing firms may quickly exhaust their network of friends and family and have
to move to more costly recruiting practices. There is also anecdotal evidence
of large manufacturing plants exhausting the local supply of a certain type of
4
worker (say, with a high school diploma), and be forced to consider busing in
workers from a different labor market, or invest in the capacity of the local edu-
cation system.
In this paper, I find that over half of the manufacturing establishments in
Indonesia have a significant amount of labor market power. The median level
of market power is 1.67, which translates to a labor supply elasticity to the firm
of 0.60. This is evidence of more labor market power and across a broader spec-
trum of firms than what has previously been found in the literature. I also show
that labor market characteristics are important in explaining the variation in
market power across firms and time, but not as important as firm characteris-
tics.
These findings have several important implications. A person’s labor is usu-
ally their most valuable asset (especially in a developing country), and formal
sector employment is a common means for people to move out of poverty (La
Porta and Shleifer 2008). Industrialization is generally viewed as the engine of
growth that will pull millions of people out of poverty. Indeed, Indonesia’s in-
dustrial sector has added approximately 15 million new jobs over the last 30
years6. However, the findings in this paper suggest that firms are behaving
monopsonistically, which implies that fewer workers are employed and at lower
wages than would be if firms were operating in competitive labor markets.
In addition, the technique developed here can be used in many contexts
and for other purposes. I use a standard establishment level panel data set for
the majority of the analysis. Such data are becoming increasingly available for
many countries. The measure I develop here could also be used to refine our
6Author’s calculations based on World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
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understanding of why firms respond differently to various policies. For exam-
ple, theory predicts that firms with market power would respond differently
to a policy that increases severance payments. Firms sourcing labor in a com-
petitive market would decrease employment and see an increase in total labor
costs. However, as will be shown below, firms with market power are able to
defray some of the increased costs and not have labor costs rise as much. Lastly,
knowing whether market power is determined at the market level or individual
firm level also impacts the policy discourse. For example, a common response
to monopsonistic labor markets is a minimum wage policy. But if firms in the
same labor market have different levels of market power, a market wide min-
imum wage policy will have mixed results, changing the overall cost-benefit
analysis.
My work is also relevant to the recent studies looking at the differences in
total factor productivity (TFP) across countries (Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare
2005; Rusticcia and Rogerson 2008; Hsieh and Klenow 2009). Klenow and
Rodriguez-Clare examine how different rates of technology adoption affect the
differences of TFP across countries. Both Rusticcia and Rogerson, and Hsieh
and Klenow show that misallocation of resources across firms within a coun-
try affects the overall TFP. Firm level market power, of the kind studied in this
paper, would lead to inefficient allocation of resources across firms and is an
example of the distortions considered in these papers.
In the next section I provide a brief review of the relevant literature. Sec-
tion 3 develops the empirical methods that will be used. Section 4 describes
the Indonesian context and the data set. Section 5 presents the results on how
prevalent monopsonistic behavior is among firms. Section 6 provides checks on
6
my measure of monopsony and considers alternative explanations. Section 7
than analyzes the relative importance of firm specific and market characteristics
in determining the market power of firms. Section 8 provides some robustness
checks and considers an extension of this work. Section 9 then discusses policy
implications and concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
It has long been known that firms pay different wages to similar workers
(Krueger and Summers 1988; Davis and Haltiwanger 1991; Abowd, Kramarz,
and Margolis 1999), which suggests that firms are not sourcing labor from
a competitive labor market. Many studies have indeed found evidence for
monopsonistic behavior in specific labor markets in developed countries. Boal
and Ransom (1997) provide a nice summary, and a recent volume of the Jour-
nal of Labor Economics (April 2010) was dedicated to work on the evidence for
monopsony. Most of the studies look for monopsony by estimating the labor
supply elasticity to the firm. One way to estimate this elasticity is to regress
log employment on log wages with various controls (or vice versa). Since firms
choose labor and wages simultaneously, this approach is identified through the
use of firm level instruments that affect wages without impacting employment.
Examples of this approach include Sullivan’s study of nurses (1989), Boal’s
study of coal-mining towns in West Virginia (1995), Staiger, Spetz, and Phibbs’
study of nurses (2010), and Matsudaira’s study of the low wage health care mar-
ket in California (2010) among others.
A good example of this approach is Staiger, Spetz and Phibbs (2010) who use
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a government mandated change in the wages of registered nurses at Veteran Af-
fairs (VA) hospitals as their exogenous variation. They derive the labor supply
equation facing each hospital as a function of its own wage and the wages of its
two nearest competitors. They then estimate the elasticity of the labor supply
curve directly and instrument for the difference in wages between the hospital
and its two nearest competitors by using the VA / non-VA status of the hospital.
They find significant evidence of monopsony, with the short-run elasticity of the
labor supply curve to individual hospitals being 0.1 on average.
This is striking evidence, as other studies of the nursing market have found
smaller amounts of market power or none at all. There is some debate about the
size of Sullivan’s findings (1989), with Sullivan originally stating that the nurses
were paid between 43% (for one year changes) and 21% (for three year changes)
below marginal product. However, Boal and Ransom (1997) reinterpret Sulli-
van’s findings in a dynamic context and characterize his findings as implying
wages being between 87 and 96% of marginal product, indicating little market
power. Matsudaira (2010) also looks at the health care industry, focusing on
nurses and nursing aides in the long-term care industry of California. Using
a law change mandating a minimum number of staff per resident as a natural
experiment, he finds little evidence of monopsony in the market for nurses, and
significant evidence of no monopsony in the labor market for nursing aides. He
suggests that the market for nursing aides could be competitive because there
is little formal training required to become a nursing aide, allowing for sup-
ply to increase easily, and because there are more nursing homes than there are
hospitals, leading to more competition between employers.
The other primary method for estimating the labor supply elasticity to an
8
individual firm is a dynamic approach proposed by Manning (2003), based on
Burdett and Mortensen’s (1998) model of job search. Manning estimates the
elasticity of the labor supply curve to a firm as a function of the firm’s separa-
tion and recruitment rates. He shows that the labor supply elasticity can be es-
timated as a function of the separation elasticity to employment, the separation
elasticity to unemployment, and the share of recruits from employment. Hirsch,
Schank, and Schnabel (2010) use this approach to show that men have more elas-
tic labor supply curves than women using a matched employer-employee data
set from Germany. The difference in labor supply elasticities explains about a
third of the gender pay gap, as monopsonistic employers discriminate against
women. Moreover, Hirsch et al. find average labor supply elasticities to the firm
in the range of 1.9 to 3.7, which is evidence that firms do have market power.
Ransom and Sims (2010) also used this dynamic approach to study the labor
market for teachers in Missouri, and find estimates for the labor supply elastic-
ity to the firm of about 3.7.
All of the above studies have generated estimates of market power at an ag-
gregate level. However, one recent study has used the dynamic approach for
estimating monopsony to derive firm specific measures of market power. Ran-
som and Oaxaca (2010) find that men and women have different labor supply
elasticities to a specific grocery store chain in the Southwest United States. They
find that male labor supply elasticities to the firm in the range of 2.4 - 3.0, and
female labor supply elasticities between 1.5 - 2.5. I build on this work by devel-
oping a firm specific measure for monopsony that has broader coverage than
that used by Ransom and Oaxaca, and is from a more pressing context as de-
veloping countries generally have lower levels of labor regulation and worker
protection.
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In addition to the studies looking for evidence of monopsony, my work
builds on the literature that has compared the marginal revenue products of
workers to the wages they are paid. Some of the first empirical studies to do so
did the best they could with the limited data available at the time. Hildebrand
and Liu (1965) use the Annual Survey of Manufactures from 1957 to thoroughly
study manufacturing production functions. They estimate Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction functions separately by industry, finding that labor is paid between
58% and 115% of its marginal product across industries7. Thurow (1968) es-
timates production functions using time series data for the United States as a
whole from 1929-1965, and finds that labor is paid between 56 and 65% of their
marginal product. Perskey and Tsang (1975) use 35 years of aggregate US data
to study the determinates of labor market power. They find that unionization
decreases market power, whereas unemployment, inflation, and growth in cap-
ital stock all work to increase labor market power.
In their comprehensive review, Boal and Ransom (1997) discuss another se-
ries of studies that directly compare the marginal revenue product of a firm to
its wage, all using professional baseball in the United States as their context
(Scully 1974; Medoff 1976; Zimbalist 1992). Baseball is a useful context because
it is an oligopsonist organization and there is good data on the productivity of
individual labor. However, strong assumptions are needed to link that produc-
tivity to each teams’ revenue, arguing that revenue is only increased through
more wins. These studies find a range for the elasticity of labor supply between
0.14 and 1.
The agricultural economics literature has also estimated the MRPL of work-
7The top end of that range is for the Transportation Equipment industry, and is the only
estimate above 100%.
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ers, but for workers on farms. This literature has found that households do not
allocate labor as competitive theory would predict, MRPL = W (Binswanger
and Rosenzweig 1986; Udry 1996; Barrett, Sherlund, and Adesina 2008). Udry
uses a detailed agricultural panel to show that households do not equalize la-
bor productivities across plots farmed by men and women, even controlling for
detailed plot characteristics and type of crop planted. Barrett et al. find that
households do not equalize marginal revenue products of labor to their shadow
wages, and uses that inefficiency in the structural estimation of the households’
labor supply decisions.
There has been at least one other paper to investigate whether market power
was determined more at the firm or market level (Hirsch and Schumacher 2005).
Using the nursing market in the US as their context, the authors do not find ev-
idence for market determined monopsonistic behavior in the short run, nor do
they find evidence of firm level monopsony. I build on this work by employing a
more direct measure of monopsony, examining a context where monopsonistic
behavior is more likely to occur, and by looking at a broader set of occupations.
This research also adds to the literature analyzing how firms respond to pol-
icy changes. For example, consider the large literature on how a minimum wage
policy impacts the labor market. There is mixed evidence for the United States
with Neumark and Wascher (2008) finding negative employment effects of min-
imum wage policies, Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010) finding no negative effects,
and Card and Krueger (1994) famously finding positive effects. There have been
some recent studies in the developing country context that have found that
minimum wages can increase wages, although sometimes with negative em-
ployment effects (Gindling and Terrell 2005, 2010; Alatas and Cameron 2009).
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It could be that firms have different levels of market power which would im-
pact how they respond to the minimum wage policy. Theory predicts that firms
with market power would increase both employment and wages in response to
a minimum wage (if the minimum is set above the firms’ current wage and be-
low their current marginal revenue product), whereas competitive firms would
decrease employment. Another example of how monopsonistic behavior miti-
gates a firm’s response to a policy change is considered within this paper. Later
on, I develop predictions showing that firms with market power should have
smaller responses in both wages and employment to a mandated increase in
firing restrictions as compared to competitive firms.
1.3 Empirical Approach
1.3.1 Constructing the Measure of Market Power
Joan Robinson is credited with first discussing the idea of imperfect competition
in labor markets (1933). This analysis has been incorporated into many intro-
ductory economics textbooks and is the complement of the standard monopoly
treatment. This static treatment of monopsony says that firms will set wages
where R′(L) = W(L) + W ′(L)L, with R′(L) being the marginal revenue product
of labor, and the right hand side is the marginal cost of labor. The difference
between this condition and the classic competitive treatment is that the wage is
a function of labor, L, and not constant. From here, Pigou’s measure of monop-
sonistic behavior is given as:
E =
R′(L) −W(L)
W(L)
. (1.1)
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It is easy to show that E = −1, where  is the elasticity of the labor supply curve8.
In the competitive framework, firms hire up to the point where R′(L) = W, which
implies that Pigou’s measure would be equal to zero, and the elasticity would
be infinity. If firms are behaving monopsonistically, W ′(L)L > 0 and then Pigou’s
measure is strictly positive.
Since it is common for establishment data to have information on wages paid
to workers, the key step in generating this measure of market power is to de-
velop a credible estimate for the marginal revenue product of labor (MRPL) for
firms. The general idea of the approach used in this paper is to estimate a firm’s
production function and then evaluate the derivative of the production func-
tion at each firms’ current levels of revenue and employment to get a firm-year
specific measure of MRPL. To estimate the production function, I use methods
based on Blundell and Bond’s System GMM estimator for dynamic panel data
models (1998, 2000). I will briefly explain the standard approach for estimating
production functions, and then explain why its necessary to use the dynamic
panel data method for this analysis.
The literature often represents the production function of a firm with a
Cobb-Douglas specification or a transcendental-logarithmic (trans-log) form.
I consider the trans-log form in the empirical work below, and focus on the
Cobb-Douglas specification here for clarity. The Cobb-Douglas takes the form,
Yit = AL
βL
it K
βK
it , where Yit is the output of firm i at time t, Lit is the amount of labor
used in production, Kit is capital, and A is total factor productivity9. β j is the fac-
tor share of factor j ∈ {L,K}. The most direct way to estimate this is to convert it
8Let  = WL
′(W)
L(W) . Substitute the first order condition for wages into the equation for E to get
E = W
′(L)L
W(L) = 
−1
9My empirical work considers two types of labor, intermediate inputs, and capital as inputs
into the production function, but I focus on just two inputs here for clarity.
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to logs and estimate the equation:
yit = βLlit + βKkit + it, (1.2)
where the lowercase letters represent the log version of the variable and the
constant term is subsumed into the error term. An OLS estimate of this equation
will lead to biased results as there are factors unobserved to the econometrician
that affect both the firm’s choice of inputs and the firm’s output. These factors
are most often described as firm specific productivity and incorporated into the
model as:
yit = βLlit + βKkit + ωit + νit, (1.3)
with ωit representing firm-specific productivity and νit capturing any measure-
ment error or optimization errors on the part of the firm. A standard way to
estimate this equation was developed by Olley and Pakes (1996), who made
assumptions about the timing of the evolution of productivity, capital and la-
bor. The authors used the investment of the firm to break the endogeneity
between capital and productivity, arguing that the investment decisions were
made prior to the realization of the current productivity shock. Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003) extended this work by noting that firm-level data sets often had
missing values for investment causing those observations to drop out of the
estimation. Instead, they proposed that materials could be used to break the en-
dogeneity of productivity. Recently, Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2006) noted
that both Olley-Pakes (OP) and the Levinsohn-Petrin (LP) approaches suffer
from collinearity because labor is chosen by the firm in a similar manner as in-
vestment (or materials), as functions of capital and productivity. The first stage
of OP and LP can then not identify both the coefficient on labor and the non-
parametric relationship between output and capital and investment and are
therefore collinear. Their solution is to assume that capital is more fixed than
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labor, which is more fixed than investment (or materials). Productivity evolves
according to a first-order Markov process between each decision point, leading
to moment conditions which identify the parameters of the production function.
However, this approach does not allow for firms to hire labor monopsonistically,
which makes the choice of labor endogenous with the error term.
The most direct way to deal with this new form of endogeneity in the pro-
duction function is to instrument for the choice of labor. This naturally leads
to another main approach for estimating production functions, that of Blundell
and Bond, which generates instruments from within the data itself. Their tech-
nique is based on the work of Anderson and Hsiao (1982) and Arellano and
Bond (1991), who used lagged variables as instruments for first differences of
panel data. Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000) build on this by adding instruments
for current levels with lagged differences, and combining both sets of instru-
ments into a system, hence the name System GMM.
Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer provide a useful comparison of the two ap-
proaches. In the Olley-Pakes strand of approaches, productivity follows a first-
order Markov process, whereas in Blundell-Bond, productivity evolves linearly
in an AR(1) process, ωit = ρωit−1 + ηit. While the Blundell-Bond assumption is
more restrictive, it is the linearity of the AR(1) process that provides a moment
condition used in estimation. A second difference is that Blundell-Bond allows
for firm fixed effects, which are used to capture unobserved firm characteristics
that stay constant over time. The Blundell-Bond approach also requires fewer
assumptions regarding the input demand equations. The Olley-Pakes based
approaches require that productivity be strictly increasing in the proxy variable
(investment or materials), and also that there are no other factors influencing
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productivity besides capital and the proxy variable.
Van Biesebrock (2007) provides a good overview of many ways to estimate
production functions and argues that Blundell and Bond’s system GMM estima-
tor yields robust estimates when technology is heterogenous across firms and
there is a lot of measurement error in the data, or if some of the productivity
differences are constant across time. He also argues that if firms are subject to
idiosyncratic productivity shocks that are not entirely transitory, then the Olley-
Pakes’ estimators will be more efficient.
I use the Blundell-Bond estimator for three reasons. First, the data set lacks a
reliable instrument for employment, which is necessary in order to implement
the Olley-Pakes based approaches in the presence of monopsony. The Blundell-
Bond approach provides the necessary instrumental variables. Second, because
Indonesia is an emerging economy, there are likely large fixed differences in
the unobserved qualities of firms, which suggests that firm fixed effects are im-
portant. Third, the Blundell-Bond estimator is considered to be more robust to
measurement error (Van Biesebrock 2007), which is always a concern with large
firm-level data sets from developing countries. While I use the Blundell and
Bond estimator for my main results, I also check the robustness of my results
using the Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer technique, instrumenting for the en-
dogenous choice of labor with the concentration ratio of the local labor market.
The Blundell-Bond technique estimates a dynamic production function that
takes on the reduced form of
yit = ρyit−1+βL(lit−ρlit−1)+βK(kit−ρkit−1)+ (γt−ργt−1)+ (δi(1−ρ)ηit+νit+ρνit−1) (1.4)
where γt is a year fixed effect, δi is a firm fixed effect, and ρ is the autocorrelation
coefficient. I follow Roodman (2006) and estimate this equation in a two-step
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GMM procedure. The first step is used to build an optimal weighting matrix
which is then used to make the second step efficient. I use forward-orthogonal
deviations instead of first differences to minimize sample loss due to gaps in the
panel. This procedure subtracts the average of all available future observations
instead of differencing with the previous one. System GMM also has the ability
to generate many instruments, though I limit this by just using the lags from 2
and 3 periods previous and by collapsing the instruments from the different lag
lengths into one moment.
I then recover the structural parameters using standard minimum distance
techniques. The five reduced form parameters constitute the vector pˆi, and the
three structural parameters (βL, βK , ρ) = θˆ. After representing the mapping be-
tween the two vectors as h(), I can represent the minimization problem as:
minθ∈Θ{pˆi − h(θ)}′Ξˆ−1{pˆi − h(θ)}, (1.5)
where Ξˆ is the efficient weighting matrix, which is the asymptotic variance of
the first stage estimates, avar(pˆi). Then, to obtain the asymptotic variance of the
estimates, I take the Jacobian of h() and represent it as Hˆ, and then we have:
AsyVar(θˆ) =
1
n
[Hˆ′Ξ−1Hˆ]−1 (1.6)
= (Hˆ′[avar(pˆi)]−1Hˆ)−1. (1.7)
This process generates estimates for the parameters of the production func-
tion. The above process assumes that all firms in the estimation sample share
the same technology, in that I only estimate one βL. To weaken the impact of
this assumption, I estimate the production function separately by four-digit in-
dustries10. I also check the validity of this assumption by estimating the more
10As a robustness check, I estimate the production function separately by two-digit industries
and find the main results are unchanged.
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flexible transcendental-logarithmic function. The trans-log production function
takes the form,
yit = β0 +
∑
N
βNln(Nit) + (1/2)
∑
N
∑
Q
βNQln(Nit)ln(Qit), (1.8)
for each N,Q ∈ [LPR, LNP,K,M]. The Cobb-Douglas production function is
nested within this formulation, and an F-test can be conducted on the extra pa-
rameters to determine if they are jointly significantly different from zero. When
estimating this form separately by four-digit industry, the extra parameters (not
used in the Cobb-Douglas form) are not significantly different from zero in 82
of the 83 industries. Since the trans-log form puts more stress on the data, re-
quiring more observations, I also estimate the production function separately by
two-digit industry. In this case, 17 of the 19 industries reject the extra trans-log
parameters. These results lend more credence to the use of the Cobb-Douglas
production function in the main analysis.
With these industry specific estimates for the parameters of the Cobb-
Douglas production function, I then generate firm-year specific measures for
the marginal revenue product of each firm as
MRPLit =
∂Yit
∂Lit
=
βˆL jYit
Lit
, (1.9)
for firm i, year t, and industry j. It is then straightforward to calculate the firm-
year specific measure of market power from equation (3.1).
1.3.2 Testing the Measure of Market Power
Using the measure of market power, I perform two tests to see if it behaves in a
manner that is consistent with monopsony. I check if the measure is related to
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labor market concentration at both a firm and market level as traditional theory
would predict. I then also consider alternative explanations for the wage being
below the marginal revenue product of labor.
Traditional theory of monopsony predicts that firms who control a large
share of the market are able to move the price. Therefore, the larger share of
total employment that an individual firm employs should be positively corre-
lated with market power. Each firm’s employment share is the ratio of their
employment to the total level of employment in their labor market.
A similar test can be conducted at the market level. Firms in labor mar-
kets where workers do not have many other options should have more mar-
ket power than firms in labor markets where workers have many alternative
employers readily available. The number of alternative options is formalized
in measures of concentration of the labor market, which increases as the labor
markets become more sparse. A necessary condition for monopsony is that
measures of labor market concentration are positively correlated with the esti-
mated firm-level market power.
The measure of market concentration I use is the concentration ratio of the
eight largest firms in the labor market. This is calculated by summing the mar-
ket shares of the eight largest firms in the labor market. The key, as with all
measures of market concentration, is how to define the labor market. Here, I
use geographic districts. This assumes that a production worker employed by
a local furniture manufacturer could also work for the local garment manufac-
turer. Indonesia has almost 400 districts across the country, so its plausible that
workers would be willing to move to another job in the same district as its not
that far away. However, this definition does assume that the skills of workers
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are able to cross industries, which might not always be the case.
There are also other potential explanations for the wedge between marginal
revenue product of labor and wages, I consider whether monopolistic competi-
tion, compensating differentials, or efficiency wages may lead to a firm not pay-
ing wages equal to the marginal revenue product of workers. I am able to con-
trol for these competing explanations with the nature of my data and method.
At the root of Pigou’s measure of market is a gap between the marginal rev-
enue product of the worker and the wage the firm pays the worker. The monop-
sonistic explanation for this gap depends on there being an upward sloping la-
bor supply curve to the firm. However, if a firm is a monopolist in the product
market and operating in a competitive labor market, Robinson (1933) has shown
that the firm will not pay workers the full value of their production. The key dif-
ference in this situation is that the monopolist has a ’value of the marginal prod-
uct’ (P ·MP) that is different from the marginal revenue product of labor. This is
because the additional output generated by the marginal worker will reduce the
output price of the monopolist, lowering the marginal revenue generated. This
monopolistic exploitation of the workers is distinct from the inefficiency I mea-
sure in this paper since my method estimates the marginal revenue product of
labor directly. Any monopolistic exploitation that occurs is above and beyond
the wage mark-down I measure in this paper.
Compensating differentials are another explanation for why a firm might not
pay a worker their marginal revenue product. Here, the firm is still trying to set
their total labor costs equal to the marginal revenue product of labor, but some
of the labor costs are not in the form of wages. To the extent that these extra
benefits are pecuniary, my measure is not biased as my data has information on
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both wages and benefits paid to workers. However, there may be other non-
pecuniary factors that influences the wages paid to workers. These could be
the riskiness of the job, the cleanliness of the workplace, or the quality of the
co-workers. If workers took less pay to work in exchange for some of these
benefits, their marginal revenue product would not equal their wage. This only
biases my results if all workers have the same prices for these non-pecuniary
attributes. If workers have different prices, which is a more realistic assumption,
then the labor supply curve to the firm is upward sloping as the firm needs
to pay higher wages to attract the next worker who has a marginally lower
valuation of that firm’s working conditions.
Efficiency wages are often used to explain wage variation across firms, as
some firms find it profitable to pay above market wages. Yet, to the extent the
same efficiency wage is paid to all workers in a particular firm, this will not
affect my analysis as the firm will still set the marginal revenue product of labor
equal to the wage. And since efficiency wages are actually paid to the workers,
they will be observed in my data as actual wages. The efficiency wage may be
different from the market wage, but my analysis makes no assumptions about
the market wage.
This discussion does not conclusively demonstrate that the mark-down I
measure is solely due to monopsonistic behavior on the part of the firm, but
shows that the measure is consistent with firms having labor market power.
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1.3.3 Separating Influences of Market Power
With a measure of market power for each firm-year observation, I am able to
separate the within-labor market variation from the between labor market vari-
ation in market power. To do this I will generate partial correlation coefficients
for different sets of independent variables. The partial correlation coefficient for
an independent variable, X, captures how much of the overall variation in the
dependent variable can be explained by X. To calculate the partial correlation
coefficient for a variable or set of variables, X, I first get the R2 from the model
with all of the controls and the R2X from the model with X excluded. Then the
partial coefficient is formulated as ρX = (R2 − R2X)/(1 − R2X). If the partial corre-
lation coefficient for the labor market controls is larger than the value for that
of the firm controls, than the labor market determines more of the variation in
market power than do the individual firm characteristics (or vice versa).
To control for labor market variation, I will use a measure of concentration
for the labor market and the local unemployment rate. The concentration ra-
tio varies over time and represents the traditional view of how labor markets
influence market power. As local unemployment increases, firms in that labor
market should be able to pay lower wages as there are more workers available
for any given job. I will also include labor market fixed effects which will con-
trol for any differences in the labor markets that stay constant over time. For
example, this will capture any market-specific moving costs due to language
barriers or other distinct features of areas within Indonesia.
To control for firm-level characteristics that may impact market power, I in-
clude controls for firm age, foreign ownership, output growth, firm size, and
product market concentration. Firm age could lead to more market power as
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workers prefer to work for more stable employers. But workers may also pre-
fer to work for younger firms that tend to be more dynamic, with more growth
potential, so the sign on firm age could go either way. I also control for growth
by including a measure of one-year output growth. Foreign owned firms might
be expected to have less labor market power as they are unfamiliar with the
local customs and practices, but that would just increase their recruiting costs,
and not influence their market power. However, if workers prefer to work for
foreign firms, they would have increased market power. Firm size may also af-
fect product market power, and I use capital to proxy for firm size11. Product
market power should not be mechanically correlated with labor market power
(as previously explained), but the monopolist firm may have a more secure fu-
ture which is more attractive to potential workers. In addition, I will include
firm fixed effects, which control for any time-invariant firm characteristics that
influence market power. These could be working conditions that differ across
firms, but are not captured in the total labor costs I use when constructing the
measure of market power.
1.4 Data
The data for this paper come from the Indonesia Annual Manufacturing Sur-
vey, Survei Tahunan Perusahaan Industri Pengolahan (SI). It is a census of all the
manufacturing establishments in Indonesia with at least 20 employees. Firms
are required to fill out the survey each year, and the dataset covers years 1988-
2006. Among the substantial number of variables in the dataset are the follow-
11I can not use output or employment for firm size, as those variables are used directly in the
computation of Pigou’s E.
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ing which I use in this study: output (revenue), intermediate inputs, investment,
capital, wages, non-wage compensation, number of employees, ownership, lo-
cation, industry, etc.
To construct an average wage measure for each firm, I add total wages to to-
tal benefits, and then divide by the number of employees in each firm. I repeat
this step for production and non-production workers, to get the average wage
for each type of worker. Since prices are different for consumers than they are
for industries, I deflate wages using Indonesia’s consumer price index to con-
stant 2000 Rupiah and I deflate all other monetary values using industry specific
wholesale price indices to constant 2000 Rupiah. The exchange rate in the year
2000 was about 8,400 Rupiah to 1 US Dollar. The question in the survey on
establishment ownership asks how much of the firm’s capital is owned by the
local government, central government, foreign interests, or private interests. I
follow the standard practice of considering a firm to be foreign-owned if at least
10% of its capital is foreign owned.
I performed some basic data cleaning procedures following other studies
that have used the Indonesian SI data (Blalock and Gertler 2004, Hallward-
Driemeier and Rijkers 2010). This included correcting for invalid values, miss-
ing values, and outliers. See Hallward-Driemeier and Rijkers (2010) for details.
I present results using the raw data in the robustness section and find similar
results to the ones presented in the text below.
Summary statistics for the data can be found in Table 1.1. Each observation
is a firm-year. Firms are on average 14.5 years old, which is different from the
average number of years of data I have for each firm, 12.4. Firms have on av-
erage 192 employees, with about 84% of them working as production workers
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(as opposed to non-production, or white-collar workers). Production workers
make on average 4,261,000 rupiah/year, which is about US$506 (in year 2000
dollars). The non-production workers earn over twice as much.
1.5 Market Power Results
In this section I will present results for the amount of market power establish-
ments have in Indonesia using my new technique for measuring market power.
The data provide information on both production workers and non-production
workers. Hammermesh (1993) notes that the substitutability between the two
types of workers is fairly low. Ehrenberg and Smith (2006) also show that work-
ers with more education search across a wider labor market. These findings
suggest that production and non-production workers participate in separate la-
bor markets. I therefore estimate the production functions using each type of
labor as a separate input. I also include intermediate inputs as a separate input
in the production function. The resulting Cobb-Douglas model that I estimate
is,
yit = βLPRl
PR
it +ρβLPRl
PR
it−1+βLNPl
NP
it +ρβLNPl
NP
it−1+βKkit+ρβKkit−1+βMmit+ρβMmit−1+ρyit−1+δi+µit,
(1.10)
where lPR is the natural log of production employment, lNP is the natural log
of the non-production employment, k is the natural log of capital, and m is the
natural log of the intermediate inputs used by firm i at time t.
There are a couple of econometric concerns that are important to consider
when using the System-GMM technique. The technique has the potential
to generate numerous instruments, which can overfit endogenous variables.
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Windmeijer (2005) tests the importance of the number of instruments, and pro-
vides a rule of thumb suggesting the number of instruments should be less than
the number of groups (which in this analysis is firms). I use the over-identifying
restrictions to test for the validity of the instruments by using Hansen’s test
(1982). I also check for auto-correlation in the error following Arellano-Bond
(1991), the presence of which would indicate the instruments were not exoge-
nous.
Table 1.2 presents the results of estimating a Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion using Blundell and Bond’s System GMM estimator with a reduced number
of instruments. The estimated parameters of the production function are pre-
sented for 30 of the 83 industries on the left side of the table, and the specifica-
tion tests are reported on the right side of the table. The raw averages for the
values are reported in the last row of the table. In the column reporting the t-test
of Constant Returns to Scale (CRS), none of the industries are estimated to be
significantly different from CRS, and this is true for all of the industries. Some of
the coefficients are estimated to be negative, but these observations are excluded
from the analysis. Another check on the credibility of these estimates is to com-
pare them to the actual factor shares. The raw average of the coefficients across
all the industries is reported in the last row of Table 1.2. The corresponding fac-
tor shares are 0.19, 0.05, 0.08, and 0.68 respectively. While the capital coefficient
is smaller than its factor share, the numbers are reasonably close overall.
The first two columns on the right side of the table check if there are enough
firms in each estimation sample. I pass Windmeijer’s rule of thumb in all in-
dustries. Looking at the Hansen test of the over-identifying restrictions for each
industry, it should be noted that with the large number of instruments being
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used, the test can report incredibly high values, and so I exclude industries with
P-values over 0.98. In 76 of the 83 industries, I pass Hansen’s test for the validity
of the instruments, though there are a few industries where the instruments are
not valid, with P-values near zero. Finally, in the last two columns, the P-values
for the auto-correlation tests of the error-term are reported. First-order auto-
correlation of the differences is expected as the instrument and the error share
a common term. The key test is whether there is second-order correlation in
differences, presence of which would indicate that my instruments are invalid.
The estimates for all of the industries but nine pass this test.
Taking all of these specification tests into account, the continued analysis
will focus on firms in industries that pass all of the specification tests. From the
original 306,217 firm-year observations, 241,093 passed all of the specification
tests (78.7%). Table 1.3 compares the means of the firms that passed all of the
specification tests to the firms in industries that did not pass at least one test.
The first two columns of Table 1.3 report the means and standard deviations
for the firms in industries that passed all of the specification tests. Columns (3)
and (4) display the means and standard deviations for the excluded sample. The
last column displays the t-test for equality of means between the two samples.
There are quite of few differences across the two groups. The firms that are
excluded tend to be smaller, older, and export less on average. They pay slightly
lower wages, and also are in labor markets that are more concentrated. While
all of following analyses are appropriately specified, the results may not be fully
representative of the broader population of firms in Indonesia.
With the estimates for the parameters of the production function, I am able
to calculate the marginal revenue product of labor for each type of worker sep-
27
arately. The Cobb-Douglas revenue-production function for each firm is
Y = A(LPR)βLPR (LNP)βLPRKβKMβM ,
with LPR being the number of production workers in the firm and LNP being
the number of non-production workers. The marginal revenue product for each
type of worker is then,
∂Y
∂LPR
=
βˆLPRY
LPR
(1.11)
∂Y
∂LNP
=
βˆLNPY
LNP
(1.12)
As indicated above, Pigou’s measure of market power can then be calculated
separately for production and non-production workers using the average wage
the firm pays to a worker of each type by the formula (MRPLl −Wl)/Wl for each
l ∈ (PR,NP).
Table 1.4 presents the results for Pigou’s measure of market power. The top
two lines of the table show the results for the production workers and the bot-
tom two for the non-production workers. Column (2) presents the mean of mar-
ket power, weighted by the number of employees in each firm. Columns (3)
displays the median of the distribution, and then columns (4) - (6) display the
percentage of observations that lie in three ranges. Column (4) consists of firms
with measures of Pigou’s E below 0.33, which suggests that the firms have little
to no market power. The value of 0.33 is not an exact cutoff, but indicates that
the workers’ MRPL is only 33% above their wage. Ideally, a competitive firm
would pay wages equal to the marginal revenue product of labor, which would
yield a value for E of zero. Column (5) has firms with measures of Pigou’s E be-
tween 0.33 and 2, which suggests that they have some market power. The value
of 2 for Pigou’s E indicates that workers’ MRPL is three times higher than their
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wage. The last column is for firms with a lot of market power, having measures
greater than 2.
Table 1.4 reports the values for Pigou’s E and shows that many firms have
market power, though there is variation in market power across firms. The main
results are presented in the first row, and show that the median firm has a value
of Pigou’s E equal to 1.93, which is equivalent to a labor supply elasticity to
the firm of 0.52. The categories show that 40% of firms have little to no mar-
ket power, whereas 28% have some market power, and about 31% have a lot of
market power. To my knowledge, this is the first estimate for the monopsonistic
behavior of firms in an emerging economy, and also the first to show the distri-
bution of market power across firms. While the median firm has more market
power than most of the previous estimates in the literature, it is not the biggest.
Comparing the top and bottom panels shows that there are more firms with
a lot of market power over non-production workers than firms with market
power over production workers. This suggests that non-production workers are
less mobile and not as able to find alternative jobs, while the production work-
ers are more mobile. This could be due to non-production jobs requiring more
firm specific human capital, preventing non-production workers from having a
lot of alternative jobs they could switch to. However, these results are suspect
because there is a wide variety of worker quality within the non-production cat-
egory, and my method assumes that all workers in each category have the same
productive ability. For this reason, and because the production workers com-
prise the vast majority of the workforce, I will focus the rest of the analysis on
the production workers.
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1.6 Testing the Measure of Market Power
Table 1.5 reports the results of two tests of whether the measure of market power
I have calculated is consistent with the traditional understanding of monop-
sony. The first two columns check if firms that employ a higher share of labor in
their local labor market have more market power. The last two columns check
whether firms in more concentrated labor markets have more market power. I
use the natural log of the measure of market power as the dependent variable,
and since some of the firms have values of market power below zero, I add a
value of one to each observation prior to taking the natural log12.
The first column in Table 1.5 shows the results of a GLS regression using
the firm’s labor market share as the primary control variable, and also year, in-
dustry, and region dummies. The coefficient is positive and significant, as the
traditional view of monopsony predicts. The second column includes other con-
trols that could influence how much market power a firm has. The coefficient
on the firm’s market share remains positive and significant.
The last two columns check whether market power is positively correlated
with market concentration. I allow market concentration to affect market power
non-linearly, creating dummy variables for firms in markets with low and high
levels of market concentration. I define low and high as the firms in the lowest
and highest quartiles of market concentration. The firms with medium levels
of concentration are the omitted category. The results do show that firms in
labor markets with low levels of concentration have less market power. The
coefficient on the highly concentrated labor markets is positive, as theory would
12The minimum value possible for Pigou’s E is -1 since the marginal revenue product of labor
is constrained to be positive.
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predict, but is not statistically significant in either specification.
The results of these tests support my claim that this measure of market
power is consistent with monopsonistic behavior. Another check is consid-
ered in the extension section below. There, I develop predictions for how firms
with market power would respond differently to an increase in firing restric-
tions than firms in competitive labor markets. Upon testing these predictions,
I find results consistent with the predictions, providing more support that the
measure I calculate is capturing the monopsonistic behavior of firms.
1.7 Separating Influences of Market Power
The previous literature has documented the existence of market power in some
labor markets, though it was not able to separate whether the market power is
a characteristic of the labor market or if firms within the same labor market can
have different levels of monopsony power. In this section, I take the individ-
ual firm-year measurements of market power that I have produced and regress
those on various firm and market characteristics to see which factors influence
market power more. I do this for production workers using a simple General-
ized Least Squares (GLS) model by systematically adding the various controls13.
Using the log of Pigou’s measure of market power, ei jt = ln(Ei jt), for firm i in la-
bor market j at time t, as the dependent variable. The model I estimate is
ei jt = α0 + Xitα1 + Yjtα2 + γ j + νi + i jt, (1.13)
13I use feasible-GLS because its a more efficient estimator than OLS, giving more weight to
observations with lower variance.
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with Xit being a set of time-varying firm characteristics, Yjt a set of time-varying
labor market characteristics, γ j a labor market fixed effect, and νi capturing the
firm fixed effects.
Based on the traditional economic theory of monopsony, I use the concen-
tration ratio of the eight largest employers in the labor market as a time-varying
labor market control. I also include the local unemployment rate as a measure
of labor market slackness. This measure is calculated from Indonesia’s labor
force survey, Sakernas, though I only have this data for years 1990-200614. The
more recent theoretical developments also suggest what the appropriate firm
controls should be. Firm differentiation can lead to market power, suggesting
that firm characteristics impacting workers’ perceptions of the firm should be
controlled for. Here, I use the age of the firm, an indicator of whether the firm
is foreign owned, and a measure of firm size. I use capital as a proxy for firm
size as both output and employment are directly used in the construction of the
market power measure. Schmieder (2010) has also shown that new firms are
a good place to find evidence of monopsonistic behavior since they are hiring
a lot of workers, and therefore contend with the upward sloping labor supply
curve more. Since I already control for firm age, I include an additional control
of one-year output growth to capture the firms that are growing.
As mentioned above, product market power is not mechanically linked to
the measure of labor market power used here. However, workers may prefer
to work for monopolistic firms as they may have a more secure future. To test
for this, I calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for the product market by
2-digit industries within each province.
14I drop 1988 and 1989 from this stage of the analysis.
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Table 1.6 presents the results of these GLS models where the controls have
been entered systematically to enable the calculation of partial correlation coef-
ficients for each group of controls. In the models without firm fixed effects, the
standard errors are clustered at the labor market level to account for the correla-
tion among the firms within the same labor market. Industry and year dummies
are included in all models to control for any factors that are constant across all
firms in the same year or industry, respectively. All models are weighted by the
number of production employees at each firm.
I consider three models using various sets of the fixed effects. All of the mod-
els include industry and year dummies, whereas the second model includes the
labor market fixed effects (local district), and the last model adds the firm fixed
effects. The even numbered columns report the partial correlation coefficients
for each group of controls.
Column (1) includes all of the time varying controls, but neither the market
nor firm fixed effects. Firm in labor markets with low levels of concentration do
have less labor market power. The coefficients on the other two controls are not
statistically significant.
Looking at the firm specific characteristics, the age of the firm is not signifi-
cantly related to market power, though both the foreign ownership of the firm
and the output growth are statistically significant. The coefficients on foreign
ownership and output growth suggest that foreign owned-growing firms have
more market power, though the coefficient on output growth is small. Neither of
the measures of product market concentration are statistically significant, how-
ever the proxy for firm size is positively correlated with market power.
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The overall amount of variation explained by this model, using the adjusted
R2, is 0.276. About 1% of this variation can be explained by labor market char-
acteristics, whereas 36% can be explained by firm specific characteristics. The
rest of the explained variation is explained by the industry and year fixed ef-
fects. These partial correlations show that firm specific characteristics are more
important in explaining the overall amount of variation in labor market power
than are labor market characteristics, but there is still much of the variation left
unexplained.
The second two models introduce labor market fixed effects and then firm
fixed effects. While these controls can capture unobservable characteristics of
the labor market and firm that may influence labor market power, the fixed ef-
fects change the interpretation of the results and pose a difficult task for the
individual controls to influence the market power of a firm labor market over
time. Hence the primary interest in these results is the correlation that can be
explained by the various sets of controls. However, it is possible to look at the
firm specific controls in the second model when just the labor market fixed ef-
fects are included, as they attempt to explain the variation within a labor market
across firms.
The second model, with results beginning in column (3), adds labor market
fixed effects to the regression. These fixed effects capture market specific char-
acteristics that stay constant over time, such as market specific moving costs.
Examining the firm specific characteristics shows that most are the same sign as
the results in column (1), with larger, foreign-owned, and growing firms having
more market power, but firms low concentrated labor markets having less.
Adding labor market fixed effects to the model increases the overall amount
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of variation explained to 0.365. Now the majority of the variation is explained
by the labor market fixed effects. While the firm specific observables explain
more variation in market power than the observable labor market characteris-
tics, the unobserved labor market characteristics are more important.
The last model adds firm fixed effects and the results are displayed in col-
umn (5). The foreign ownership and firm age controls are dropped as they do
not vary over time in combination with the year effects. The interpretation of the
coefficients changes some as now they explain how labor market power changes
over time within a firm. With the inclusion of the firm fixed effects, the amount
of variation in market power that can be explained has increased significantly.
Mechanically, all of the new variation is explained by the firm fixed effects, as
they are the only new controls added to the model. While this adds a lot of
new variables, the adjusted R2 still reports a significant increase in variation ex-
plained. The observable characteristics of the firm explain more variation in
market power than both the observed and unobserved labor market character-
istics. This makes sense as there is probably not much variation in labor market
characteristics over time.
Overall, the results in Table 1.6 show that there is more within labor market
variation in labor market power than there is between labor market variation.
The results confirm the traditional theories of monopsony, that the labor market
influences the market power of the firms in the market. However, the results
also support the new theories of monopsony, that there is variation in market
power across firms within the same labor market. The results provide the first
attempt at trying to quantify the importance of each set of characteristics, which
enables the determination that firm characteristics are more important in ex-
35
plaining the overall variation in labor market power.
1.8 Extensions and Robustness Checks
In this section, I will first consider an extension of this research, and then pro-
vide some robustness checks. As previously mentioned, the extension considers
how market power enhances our understanding of firm behavior, and how this
might inform policy analysis. I will specifically analyze whether firms with mar-
ket power respond differently to an increase in labor costs than a firm operating
in a competitive labor market.
To do this, I first develop predictions for how firms’ market power would
respond to an increase in labor costs, and how firms with more market power
would respond differently than competitive firms. I test these predictions us-
ing a natural experiment surrounding the passage of a set of Labor Laws in
2003. This is following work I have done that uses the same natural experiment
to identify how the law change impacted standard firm outcomes (2012). La-
bor Law 13 significantly increased the size of severance payments firms were
required to pay, decentralized the setting of minimum wages, and increased
the restrictions on the use of temporary workers. Using difference-in-difference
methods, my other work found that the labor laws increased the total costs of la-
bor, decreased output and employment, and increased the capital-labor ratio of
treated firms. The natural experiment used in the analysis is based on differing
levels of enforcement of the laws across different firms15. The paper uses two
15The idea of different compliance levels is supported theoretically by Basu, Chau, and Kan-
bur (2010) among others, and empirically by Harrison and Scorse (2004, 2010), and Manning
and Rosead (2007).
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complementary approaches for determining which firms are more likely to com-
ply with the law and which are not. The first approach argues that large firms
are more likely to comply with the new laws, whereas the small, domestically-
owned firms are less likely to do so. The second approach states that firms
located in districts where the provincial capital is located are more likely to
comply with the law, whereas firms located in other districts are less likely to
comply. This second approach also enables the use of a matched difference-in-
differences estimator, which constructs the control group by selecting the firms
not in the district with the provincial capital that are most similar to the treated
firms.
The same natural experiment can be used here to test my measure of market
power. Let β > 0 be the slope of the labor demand curve and α < 0 be the slope
of the labor supply curve. If the change in the labor laws increases the costs
of labor by δ, then the change in wages for firms with market power would be
δ(1 − α2α−β ). If the firm sources labor from a competitive labor market, then α = 0
and the change in wages would be equal to δ. Since α > 0 and β < 0, the monop-
sonistic firms have a smaller change in wages than do competitive firms. The
change in labor demand for firms with market power would be δ
β−2α which is
smaller than the similar change for competitive firms, δ/β. It is straightforward
to show that market power should decrease in response to the increased labor
costs16
The estimates below use standard cutoffs for firm size, with large firms hav-
ing more than 250 employees, and small firms having less than 50. Firms were
16Let p0 be the Y-intercept of the labor demand curve and y0 be the Y-intercept of the labor sup-
ply curve, then the change in the labor law shifts the labor supply curve up by δ, which changes
the Y-intercept to y0 + δ. So, the resulting change in E can be calculated as ∂E∂y0 =
αp0β−2α2p0
(y0(α−β)+αp0)2 < 0.
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assigned to their respective treatment and control groups based on their aver-
age size between 2000 and 2002 so the composition of the treatment and control
groups stays fixed across the study period. This removes any bias associated
with firms changing groups based their responses to the policy change. The
data from 2003 is excluded from the comparison as that was an adjustment year.
Note that the sample size is smaller as the years are restricted to 2000-2002 and
2004-2006 for this analysis, and firms having between 100 and 250 employees
are also excluded.
Table 1.7 reports the results of the increased labor costs on the distribution
of market power. The prediction is that market power should decrease. The
first two columns report the results using firm size to identify the treatment
and control groups. Columns 3 and 4 use the location of the firm to identify
the treatment and control groups, and the last columns build on this by using
propensity score matching to construct the control group. The odd numbered
columns only include the treatment dummies, and year, industry and region
dummies. The even numbered columns also include firm specific controls for
capital, firm age, foreign ownership, the mandated minimum wage, product
market concentration, and labor market concentration.
The coefficient of interest is on the interaction term between Treated and
Post − 2003. Whenever the coefficient is statistically significant, it is negative,
which supports the predicted impact of the policy change. This result suggests
that as labor costs increased due to the increased firing restrictions mandated by
the new labor law, the amount of market power firms had decreased. The law
change shifted the labor supply curve inward, and if the labor demand curve
did not change, the distance between the marginal revenue product of labor
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and the wage was reduced.
I next consider how the law change differentially impacted the wages of
firms with market power and those without. To facilitate this, I create a dummy
variable that is equal to 1 if firms have an average level of market power greater
than 2, and equal to 0 if the market power is below 0.33. These cutoffs are the
same as those used Table 1.4. This new dummy variable is interacted with the
treatment and post-2003 dummy variables to create a triple interaction. The
prediction is that firms with market power will have a smaller reaction to the
law change than firms that operate competitively. Table 1.8 reports the results
and the coefficient on the triple interaction is negative and significant in the
last three columns. The coefficient on the triple interaction in the last column
says that firms with market power had a 6.6% smaller response in wages to the
law change than did firms without market power. Competitive firms would see
their labor costs increase by the full amount of the value of the increased firing
restrictions, whereas firms with market power are able to defray some of those
costs.
The results of a similar exercise, but now examining the employment re-
sponse, are reported in Table 1.9. The coefficient on the triple interaction is only
significant in one specification, and it is positive. This is not the predicted rela-
tionship, though the result appears to be sensitive to the specification as it only
appears once.
I next consider the robustness of my results to various decisions that I made
in calculating my main results. I first test the impact of the data cleaning pro-
cedures on my results. The results using the raw data are presented in the first
panel of Table 1.10. The estimate using the raw data has a higher mean, but
39
a lower median. This can be attributed to the raw data being noisier. This is
reflected in the distribution of firms as well, with the raw data have a larger
percentage of firms without market power, and not as many firms in the middle
category. There are fewer observations for the raw data since I impute missing
values in the main analysis.
In the main analysis, I estimated the production function separately by four-
digit industry, of which there were 83 industries. For comparison purposes, I
also present the results estimating the production function separately by two-
digit industry, of which there are 19. These estimates using the two-digit should
be less precise, as they assume more firms of different types share the same pro-
duction technology. The estimates using these larger groupings are presented
in the second panel of Table 1.10. The median value of market power is lower
using the broader groupings, and the categories show that a lower percentage
of firms have at least some market power. However, fewer industries pass all of
the specification tests, so the results are less representative.
The third panel of Table 1.10 report the results when only looking at the firms
in industries where all of the parameters of the production function were esti-
mated to be positive. These extra constraints are applied in addition to all of the
specification tests included in the main analysis. With the additional constraints,
the sample size is cut almost in half, though the median value of market power
only increased to 2.10. The composition of the different categories of market
power are also very similar to the main results.
The next robustness check I perform considers an alternative method for
estimating the production function. As mentioned above, another standard ap-
proach for estimating production functions is developed by Ackerberg, Caves,
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and Frazer (ACF 2006). In order to apply this approach to this analysis, I need
an instrument to break the endogenous choice of labor with the firms’ market
power. I use the labor market HHI calculated at the local geographic district as
an instrument for labor in the production function. The density of the local la-
bor market influences the firms’ choice of labor, but is independent of the firms’
output levels, except through its impact on the amount of labor a firm hires.
I use the predicted amount of labor hired in the two-step procedure outlined
by Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer. To obtain standard errors for the estimates, I
bootstrap the entire procedure 200 times (including the instrument estimation),
blocking the sample selection at the firm level, and estimating a separate pro-
duction function for each four-digit industry as done in the main analysis.
The estimates of market power using the ACF procedure are reported in the
third panel of Table 1.10. The results show significantly more market power
than the main results, with over 80% of firms having some amount of market
power, and almost 50% having a lot of market power. Since the wages for the
firms are the same in both approaches, the ACF procedure has estimated much
higher marginal revenue products for each firm. Accordingly, the main results
using the Blundell-Bond procedure are a more conservative estimate of the mar-
ket power of firms.
The last robustness check I perform is to leverage the panel nature of my data
and estimate the production function separately by individual firms. I have 19
years of data, though, only each firm has only 12.4 years of data on average. So,
I am not able to do this for every firm, but I can get results for firms where I
do have enough observations. The results using this method are reported in the
last two lines of Table 1.10. The results show significantly more market power
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for most firms, as evidenced by the median level of market power being 15 and
over 82% of the firms having a lot of market power.
All of these robustness checks show estimates for the market power of firms
either similar to or greater than the main results presented in Table 1.4. This sug-
gests that the main results are a conservative estimate for the degree of monop-
sony in the labor markets of Indonesia.
1.9 Conclusion
This paper has measured monopsonistic behavior by estimating the marginal
revenue product for each firm and comparing that to the average wage the firm
pays its workers. This was done for both production and non-production work-
ers using Blundell and Bond’s System-GMM technique for estimating produc-
tion functions. I find that over half the firms in the sample have a significant
amount of market power, with a median value of Pigou’s E of 1.93. To my
knowledge, this is the first direct evidence for monopsonistic behavior by firms
in an emerging economy.
My approach fits the data reasonably well, as over 84% of the observations
are in industries that pass all of the specification tests. I also find that firms
with a greater share of the labor market have more market power, and firms
have less market power in more competitive districts. I also use the labor law
change in 2003 as a natural experiment to show that the measure of market
power responds to the increased labor costs as theory would predict.
I then considered whether a firm’s market power is more attributable to firm
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level characteristics or labor market factors. My results show that while la-
bor market characteristics are important in explaining the variation in market
power, the firm specific characteristics are more important.
This work sheds light on the policy discussion in emerging economies, as
formal sector employment is often viewed as a key tool in reducing poverty
for a large number of people. While formal sector employment may indeed be
pulling a lot of people out of poverty, this research suggests that it could be play-
ing an even larger role in reducing poverty if firms operated more competitively
in the labor market.
Also, a common policy prescription is a minimum wage. With the traditional
labor supply graph in mind, a minimum wage would move the firms’ choice of
labor along their existing labor supply curve. This policy is efficiency increasing
if firms are facing an upward sloping labor supply curve17. However, the impact
of the policy would be muted if firms are facing different labor supply curves.
The government could not implement a firm-specific minimum wage policy
even if it knew what the optimal level should be. This paper shows that firms
have different levels of market power, indicating that they are facing different
labor supply curves, which would mitigate the impact of any minimum wage
policy.
Moreover, this research suggests an additional avenue of policy prescrip-
tions. Since, each firm’s market power is due to them facing an upward sloping
labor supply curve, any policy that flattens the labor supply curve would be
making the labor market more efficient. This could be done by policies that
17Recent literature for developing countries has shown that minimum wage policies can in-
crease wages, though that comes with negative employment effects (Gindling and Terrell 2005,
2010, Alatas and Cameron 2009).
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make it easier for a firm to find additional workers, or by policies that reduce
the variation in worker’s preferences for firms. A policy of the first sort might
be a job training program or an improved educational system that produces
more qualified workers. A policy of the latter kind might be a firing restrictions
regulation, that would reduce the perceived differences across firms in job secu-
rity. Indeed, this is what I found in Table 1.7. In response to an increase in firing
restrictions that were a part of Indonesia’s Labor Law 13 passed in 2003, monop-
sonistic behavior decreased. Future research could investigate the impact of a
national pension system on market power. Environments where a national pen-
sion is provided by the government should have lower variation in the total
benefits provided to workers across firms. The lower variation would imply a
flatter labor supply curve, and therefore a more competitive labor market.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics of All Indonesian Manufacturing Estab-
lishments
Mean SD Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% Foreign Ownership 4.32 (18.20) 0.00 100.00
Output (bn-Rph) 19.58 (160.07) 0.00 17,769
Raw Materials (bn-Rph) 12.65 (90.36) 0.00 17,693
Investment (bn-Rph) 1.72 (92.75) 0.00 24,030
Capital Stock (bn-Rph) 18.49 (584.34) 0.00 179,044
% Output Exported 11.45 (29.28) 0.00 1,220
Value Added/Emp (mn-Rph) 22.71 (130.67) -6.84 31,486
Firm Age 14.50 (14.49) 0.00 105.00
# Employees 192.03 (653.02) 10.00 42,649
% Production Wkrs 83.84 (14.23) 1.19 100.00
% w/ HS diploma 27.38 (26.86) 0.00 192.00
% w/ College degree 1.12 (2.71) 0.00 53.33
Avg Wage-PR (th-Rph) 4,261 (2,990) 0.78 137,339
Avg Wage-NP (th-Rph) 9,491 (79,403) 0.00 34,927,880
Labor Mkt Share 0.016 (0.066) 0.000 1.000
Labor Conc. 8CR 0.253 (0.127) 0.091 1.000
Num 306,217
Notes: All values are in constant 2000 Rupiah (Rph). Data covers years 1988 -
2006. Standard deviations are in parentheses. The export data is only available for
years 1990-2000, 2004, and 2006. The education information is available for years
1995-1997, and 2006. PR stands for Production workers and NP stands for Non-
Production workers.
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Table 1.2: Selected Cobb-Douglas Production Function Estimates by Industry using System-
GMM
CRS Num
Industry βPR βNP βk βm Sum t-test Firms Hansen AR(1) AR(2)
Meat Processing 0.18 -0.12 -0.01 0.93 0.99 0.042 48 0.16 0.00 0.31
Fish Processing 0.14 0.03 -0.02 0.80 0.96 0.215 718 0.82 0.12 0.28
Fruits and Veg. 0.16 -0.03 -0.05 0.72 0.80 1.052 103 0.74 0.00 0.71
Cooking Oils 0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.92 0.95 0.183 345 0.24 0.00 0.25
Dairy Products 0.09 -0.07 0.10 0.79 0.91 0.437 44 0.24 0.01 0.40
Grain Products 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.80 0.90 0.562 641 0.06 0.00 0.08
Starches -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.95 0.92 0.396 306 0.83 0.00 0.30
Animal Feeds 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.88 1.00 0.023 104 0.25 0.00 0.97
Bakery Products 0.16 0.04 0.02 0.83 1.05 0.315 844 0.70 0.00 0.36
Sugar 0.75 0.12 0.07 0.50 1.45 1.892 140 0.92 0.00 0.14
Apparel 0.47 0.02 0.04 0.50 1.03 0.226 2,943 0.36 0.00 0.50
Leather Prep. 0.16 0.12 -0.06 0.79 1.01 0.044 96 0.58 0.03 0.20
Leather Finishing 0.45 0.03 -0.03 0.68 1.13 0.496 175 0.87 0.00 0.38
Footwear 0.18 0.20 -0.02 0.64 1.01 0.033 548 0.97 0.00 0.99
Sawmilling 0.12 0.07 0.03 0.69 0.91 0.496 1,346 0.12 0.00 0.30
Plywood 0.30 -0.01 0.01 0.76 1.06 0.312 243 0.14 0.02 0.68
Builders’ Carpentry 0.19 0.04 -0.01 0.75 0.97 0.149 539 0.72 0.07 0.53
Wood Containers -0.12 0.10 0.03 0.71 0.71 1.111 72 0.20 0.16 0.75
Other Wood 0.17 0.00 0.10 0.67 0.94 0.227 572 0.55 0.00 0.94
Pulp and Paper 0.73 -0.03 0.11 0.49 1.29 1.427 171 0.08 0.00 0.26
Corrugated Paper 0.17 0.10 0.00 0.65 0.92 0.343 220 0.69 0.00 0.74
Other Paper -0.25 0.25 -0.05 0.97 0.93 0.268 66 0.54 0.26 0.52
Book Publishing 0.24 0.16 -0.00 0.76 1.15 0.911 196 0.06 0.02 0.35
Newspapers 0.48 -0.08 0.15 0.58 1.14 0.457 41 0.75 0.00 0.68
Other Publishing 0.42 0.00 0.01 0.78 1.21 0.985 351 1.00 0.01 0.79
Printing -0.02 0.20 0.06 0.72 0.96 0.183 99 0.32 0.00 0.23
Motor Vehicles 0.11 0.09 0.05 0.71 0.96 0.138 87 0.74 0.00 0.79
Vehicle Parts 0.12 -0.03 -0.01 0.84 0.92 0.297 208 0.30 0.01 0.15
Motorcycles 0.15 -0.08 -0.01 0.93 1.00 0.022 102 0.97 0.00 0.12
Bicycles -0.10 -0.12 0.06 0.89 0.74 1.054 99 0.66 0.00 0.71
Raw Average 0.23 0.05 0.01 0.73 1.03 0.374 346 0.56 0.01 0.50
Notes: 30 of the 83 industry categories are presented here. P-Values are listed for specification tests.
There are 33 instruments in every estimation.
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Table 1.3: Comparing the Means of the Firms in Industries that Passed All Spec-
ification Tests to Firms that Did Not Pass
Passed Spec. Tests Did Not Pass
Mean SD Mean SD t-test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
% Foreign Ownership 4.53 (18.71) 3.52 (16.14) 13.72
Output (bn-Rph) 20.99 (173.41) 14.36 (95.52) 12.87
Raw Materials (bn-Rph) 13.40 (95.32) 9.88 (68.89) 10.58
Investment (bn-Rph) 1.68 (82.72) 1.89 (122.93) 0.42
Capital Stock (bn-Rph) 19.45 (642.36) 14.91 (279.13) 2.66
% Output Exported 12.06 (29.87) 9.22 (26.90) 20.98
Value Added/Emp (mn-Rph) 22.78 (134.23) 22.47 (116.56) 0.58
Firm Age 14.41 (14.63) 14.85 (13.93) 6.87
# Employees 208.26 (709.49) 131.92 (370.10) 37.29
% Production Wkrs 84.06 (13.88) 83.02 (15.40) 15.32
% w/ HS diploma 28.10 (26.63) 24.75 (27.54) 12.92
% w/ College degree 1.09 (2.62) 1.22 (3.00) 4.70
Avg Wage-PR (th-Rph) 4,339 (2,936) 3,972 (3,169) 26.62
Avg Wage-NP (th-Rph) 9,667 (88,169) 8,813 (25,358) 4.08
Labor Market Share 0.016 (0.067) 0.014 (0.059) 8.42
Labor Conc. 8CR 0.251 (0.127) 0.259 (0.126) 13.70
Num Firm-Year Obs. 241,093 . 65,124 . .
Num. Industries 61 . 22 . .
Notes: All values are in constant 2000 Rupiah (Rph). Data covers years 1988 - 2006. Standard
deviations are in parentheses. The export data is only available for years 1990-2000, 2004, and
2006. The education information is available for years 1995-1997, and 2006. PR stands for
Production workers and NP stands for Non-Production workers.
Table 1.4: Summary of Pigou’s Measure of Market Power, E
Percent of firms with
Num Mean Median E < 0.33 0.33≤ E ≤ 2 E > 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Production 241,093 5.35 1.93 40.35 28.44 31.21
Workers (0.30)
Non-Production 177,473 10.17 0.40 44.43 22.47 33.11
Workers (3.58)
Notes: Data covers years 1988 - 2006. Means are weighted by the number of employees of each
type in each firm. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 1.5: Checking the Relationship Between Traditional Measures of Market
Power and Pigou’s E
Dependent Var. = ln(Pigou’s E+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm Market Share 0.742*** 0.768***
(0.128) (0.154)
Labor Market Concentration - Low -0.093*** -0.112***
(0.024) (0.027)
Labor Market Concentration - High 0.007 0.026
(0.026) (0.028)
Local Unemployment 0.023*** 0.021***
(0.004) (0.004)
Firm Age -0.001 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001)
Foreign Ownership 0.280*** 0.324***
(0.026) (0.025)
Product Market Concentration - Low 0.054 0.050
(0.040) (0.043)
Product Market Concentration - High 0.137*** 0.251***
(0.045) (0.052)
Constant 0.135 0.203*
(0.104) (0.107)
Adj. R2 0.141 0.150 0.133 0.147
Num 290,801 227,777 240,542 188,035
Notes: Data covers years 1990 - 2006. Standard errors are in parentheses. All models include year,
industry, and region dummies, and are weighted by the number of production employees in each
firm. Labor market concentration is measured by the concentration ratio of the 8 largest firms in
the local labor market. High (low) values are defined as the highest (lowest) quartile. Product
market concentration is measured by the HHI, and high values for the index are greater than or
equal to 0.25. Low HHI are values less than or equal to 0.15.
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Table 1.6: GLS Regressions With Pigou’s E for Production Workers as the Dependent
Variable
Dependent Var. = ln(Pigou’s E+1)
Partial Partial Partial
Coef. Corr. Coef. Corr. Coef. Corr.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Labor Mkt 8CR - Low -0.104*

0.003
-0.060**

0.000
-0.024

0.003
(0.060) (0.026) (0.022)
Labor Mkt 8CR - High -0.016 -0.011 0.029
(0.045) (0.037) (0.028)
Local Unemployment 0.011 -0.002 -0.003
(0.008) (0.004) (0.003)
Foreign Owned 0.096**

0.098
0.089***

0.078
(0.041) (0.030)
Firm Age 0.000 -0.001
(0.004) (0.001)
Output Growth/100 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.100*** 
0.020
(0.006) (0.007) (0.030)
Product Mkt HHI - Low -0.047 -0.104** -0.033
(0.081) (0.044) (0.024)
Product Mkt HHI - High -0.010 0.007 0.033
(0.057) (0.043) (0.029)
ln(Capital) 0.140*** 0.131*** 0.060***
(0.017) (0.005) (0.011)
Constant -1.553*** -1.371*** -0.303
(0.335) (0.094) (0.203)
L-Mkt Fixed Effects No Yes
}
0.123 Yes
}
0.013
Firm Fixed Effects No No Yes
}
0.529
Adj. R2 0.276 0.365 0.701
Num 126,858 126,858 126,858
Notes: Data covers years 1990 - 2006 for firms with estimates of the production function that met
all of the specification tests. The labor market is defined as the local district. Standard errors
are in parentheses. Industry and year dummies are included in all regressions. All models are
weighted by the number of production employees at each firm. In models without firm effects,
standard errors are clustered at the district level. The even numbered columns contain partial
correlation coefficients. They do not sum up to the total R-squared because of the industry and
year dummies.
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Table 1.7: Difference-in-Differences Results for Impact of Labor Law on Market
Power
Dependent Var = By Firm Size By Location Matched Control
ln (Pigou’s E +1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated 0.577*** 0.202*** 0.101*** 0.083*** 0.022* 0.021*
(0.017) (0.023) (0.015) (0.017) (0.011) (0.013)
Post-2003 0.148*** 0.129*** 0.132*** -0.006 0.119*** 0.129***
(0.018) (0.036) (0.015) (0.032) (0.017) (0.023)
Treated * Post-2003 -0.058** -0.018 -0.038* -0.038* 0.005 0.001
(0.023) (0.025) (0.019) (0.021) (0.017) (0.018)
Constant 1.796*** 0.788 1.962*** 0.724 1.118*** 1.572**
(0.162) (0.905) (0.124) (0.714) (0.126) (0.719)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Adj. R2 0.157 0.191 0.089 0.163 0.088 0.163
Num 40,384 31,247 66,572 52,477 66,572 52,477
Notes: Data covers years 2000-2002, and 2004-2006. Standard errors are in parentheses. All mod-
els include year, region, and industry effects. Controls include capital, minimum wage, firm age,
foreign ownership, product market concentration, and labor market concentration.
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Table 1.8: Difference-in-Differences Results for Impact of Labor Law on Wages of
Production Workers
Dependent Var = By Firm Size By Location Matched Control
ln (Prod. Wages) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated 0.315*** -0.296*** 0.134*** 0.117*** 0.127*** 0.114***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.011) (0.010) (0.015) (0.013)
Post-2003 -0.001 0.042 0.151*** 0.068*** 0.177*** -0.037
(0.013) (0.026) (0.011) (0.021) (0.021) (0.025)
Treated * Post-2003 -0.030 -0.042* 0.114*** 0.112*** 0.104*** 0.107***
(0.024) (0.022) (0.016) (0.014) (0.022) (0.020)
Mkt Power -0.005 -0.277*** 0.132*** -0.217*** 0.147*** -0.152***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.015)
Mkt Power * Treated 0.112*** 0.001 -0.037** -0.035*** -0.043** -0.038**
(0.020) (0.019) (0.015) (0.014) (0.020) (0.018)
Mkt Power * Post-2003 0.062*** 0.212*** 0.049*** 0.193*** 0.121*** 0.179***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.026) (0.023)
Mkt-Pow*Treat*Post-03 0.043 -0.006 -0.024 -0.062*** -0.097*** -0.066**
(0.030) (0.028) (0.022) (0.020) (0.032) (0.028)
Constant 9.081*** 5.606*** 8.510*** 6.602*** 8.515*** 7.342***
(0.118) (0.455) (0.089) (0.372) (0.125) (0.562)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Adj. R2 0.286 0.428 0.231 0.409 0.246 0.396
Num 29,167 28,963 47,163 46,810 17,533 17,501
Notes: Data covers years 2000-2002, and 2004-2006. Standard errors are in parentheses. All mod-
els include year, region and industry effects. Controls include output, capital and minimum wage.
Firms with market power are those with Pigou’s E > 2, and they are compared to firms with E <
0.33.
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Table 1.9: Difference-in-Differences Results for Impact of Labor Law on the Number of
Production Workers
Dependent Var = By Firm Size By Location Matched Control
ln (Prod. Jobs) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated 2.625*** 1.622*** -0.050** -0.109*** -0.020 -0.074***
(0.027) (0.025) (0.024) (0.014) (0.031) (0.019)
Post-2003 0.022* -0.048 0.030 -0.237*** 0.054 -0.210***
(0.013) (0.030) (0.021) (0.029) (0.042) (0.036)
Treated * Post-2003 -0.149*** -0.170*** -0.049 -0.063*** -0.048 -0.042
(0.044) (0.034) (0.033) (0.021) (0.045) (0.029)
Mkt Power -0.051*** -0.492*** 0.551*** -0.656*** 0.562*** -0.730***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.017) (0.011) (0.035) (0.022)
Mkt Power * Treated 0.216*** 0.032 0.064* 0.080*** 0.020 0.048*
(0.032) (0.026) (0.035) (0.020) (0.046) (0.027)
Mkt Power * Post-03 0.047*** 0.294*** -0.197*** 0.289*** 0.045 0.292***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.024) (0.015) (0.055) (0.033)
Mkt-Pow*Treat*Post-2003 0.072 -0.017 0.114** -0.016 -0.116 0.019
(0.052) (0.040) (0.052) (0.030) (0.072) (0.042)
Constant 2.883*** -0.283 2.741*** -3.991*** 2.475*** -5.267***
(0.091) (0.532) (0.133) (0.523) (0.110) (0.783)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Adj. R2 0.797 0.864 0.157 0.700 0.141 0.719
Num 29,167 28,963 47,163 46,810 17,533 17,501
Notes: Data covers years 2000-2002, and 2004-2006. Standard errors are in parentheses. All mod-
els include year, region and industry effects. Controls include output, capital and minimum wage.
Firms with market power are those with Pigou’s E > 2, and they are compared to firms with E <
0.33.
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Table 1.10: Robustness Checks for Pigou’s E for Production Workers
Percent of firms with
Num Mean Median E < 0.33 0.33≤ E ≤ 2 E > 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Raw Data 245,778 13.34 1.37 46.80 22.48 30.72
(1.62)
Two-Digit Industries 184,808 5.27 1.34 45.41 27.02 27.58
(0.40)
All Positive Betas 132,417 5.58 2.10 39.30 30.13 30.57
(0.56)
Ackerberg-Caves-Frazer 200,505 10.19 2.76 18.56 32.57 48.87
(0.34)
Firm Specific Prod. Fcn. 122,138 84.86 15.01 7.95 9.96 82.09
(5.21)
Notes: Data covers years 1988 - 2006. Means are weighted by the number of employees in each
firm. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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CHAPTER 2
IMPACT OF FIRING RESTRICTIONS ON FIRM PERFORMANCE:
EVIDENCE FROM INDONESIA
2.1 Introduction
One of the main goals of governments in enacting firing restriction legislation
is to protect the workers from unstable employment situations. On the other
hand, employers would like the freedom to adjust their inputs freely to deal
with changes in demand, and the presence of firing restrictions shifts some of
the adjustment burden on to the other inputs (capital, intermediate inputs, etc.).
Proponents of increased firing restrictions are changing the relative prices of
the different ways firms1 can adjust their inputs. These proponents base their
argument on negative externalities associated with the firing that the firms do
not directly bear. Not only are there significant economic costs to the person
losing their job, but there also psychological and sociological impacts to the
person as well. From the perspective of the firm, there are adjustment costs if
there is firm specific training required for the worker to reach full productivity,
though the change in legislation should not have direct impact on the firm’s
response to these productivity based adjustment costs. This paper investigates
the impact of the government’s changing the relative costs of adjustment to the
firm on the behavior of the firm and the resulting impact on the workers. The
firm outcomes that this paper will analyze include employment, wages, output,
and input mix.
1The following empirical analysis deals with establishments that may or may not be a part
of a larger corporation, but I will use the terms firm and establishment interchangeably.
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There have been studies analyzing the impact of firing restrictions, however,
this study adds to the literature in three ways. First, this study uses micro-data
from the manufacturing sector of Indonesia. Abowd and Kramarz (2003) were
the first to use micro-data, and Heckman and Pages (2004) note the importance
of using micro-data when studying this issue as opposed to the cross-country
analysis that has been common. Second, this study focuses on the impact of
the firing restrictions on the firm, where many studies have used household or
individual level data. While it is important to study the impact of the firing re-
strictions on the workers, the impact of firing restrictions on the firm has been
relatively understudied. Finally, this paper analyzes the impact of a specific pol-
icy change in Indonesia, as compared to many studies that have more abstract
measures of rigidity, such as a strictness ranking or the number of laws that
were passed for or against more flexible labor markets.
The change to the labor law in Indonesia was a large piece of legislation
(Manpower Law 13/2003) that contained many provisions. The three most con-
troversial areas dealt with severance pay, the use of contract workers, and the
setting of minimum wages (Manning and Roesad 2007). Manning and Roesad
state that the provisions on severance pay were the most criticized aspects of
the law, and my informal conversations with human resources personnel con-
firmed that the severance pay component of the law was very burdensome to
the way they conducted their operations. Severance pay is especially important
in the context of Indonesia as it is the primary source of unemployment benefits
for most wage workers (Manning and Roesad 2007). The severance payouts are
based on the workers’ wages, so any changes to minimum wages would also
carry through and affect the severance payout. Most firms respond to the in-
creased severance payouts by increasing their use of contract workers, but the
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legislation made it more difficult to do so by limiting the types of activities con-
tract workers were permitted to do and by limiting the length of their contract
(to a total of three years, after all possible renewals and extensions). Increases in
the minimum wage would have a similar predicted impact on the firm as the in-
creases in severance payments, as both policies increase the cost of labor. I have
data on the prevailing minimum wage in each province in each year, and will
use that control for the impact of the minimum wage in the empirical analysis.
The changes to severance payouts may also be the most proximate change
for the empirical analysis. The law regarding severance payouts took effect
immediately in 2003 when the law was passed. However, the impact of the
changes to minimum wages and to the regulations for contract workers may
have been more delayed. The labor law made two changes to the minimum
wage, decentralizing the setting of the minimum wage to the districts and
changing the criteria upon which the minimum wage is set. Thus, the law did
not change the minimum wage itself, just the process for how the minimum
wage was set. Also, the law did immediately change the regulations for con-
tract workers, but the three year limit for using a specific contract worker would
have a delayed impact on the behavior of the firm. So, the delayed impact of
components of the law, and the controls for the local minimum wage together
help me parse out the impact of the increased severance payment on the firms.
This study is important as many developing countries have recently adopted
similar pieces of legislation or have had debates about doing so. Indonesia has
had significant debates about reforming this law as many companies contest
that the law is too restrictive. Reforms that would have weakened the regula-
tions were almost passed in 2006, but popular support amongst the working
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class prevented the law from passing. This research will help inform the de-
bate as it provides information about the impact of a specific regulation on the
performance of firms using micro data.
The next section will review the previous work that has been done on this
topic. Section three will describe the empirical methods used in the analysis.
Section four describes the data and section five presents the results. Section six
performs some robustness checks, and the last section concludes and provides
some policy implications.
2.2 Literature Review
Many studies have looked at the impact of firing restrictions on the labor mar-
kets both in developed and developing countries. The three main outcomes
the studies have analyzed are labor turnover, employment levels, and the un-
employment rates of the local labor market. Bertola (1990) and Bentolila and
Bertola (1990) develop dynamic partial-equilibrium models which predict that
firms will reduce turnover, both hiring and firing, in the face of increased firing
restrictions. However, the impact on the level of employment, and thus unem-
ployment, depends on whether hiring or firing is reduced more. The literature
has found mixed results for the impact of severance restrictions on both employ-
ment and unemployment. Both Heckman and Pages (2004) and Addison and
Teixeira (2001) provide good summaries of the studies that find a negative rela-
tionship between job security provisions and employment, and also those that
find no evidence of such a relationship. Similarly, studies have found mixed
results regarding the relationship between job security provisions and unem-
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ployment. Most of the studies characterized in these reviews use aggregate data
from developed countries, predominantly the OECD countries. Blau and Kahn
(2002) provide a thorough analysis of the US labor market and how it compares
with other OECD countries.
A prominent study using data from a developing country is Besley and
Burgess (2004). They looked at changes in labor laws in India by state, and
how the different labor regimes impacted aggregate output, employment, in-
vestment, productivity and poverty. They used counts of laws for or against a
more flexible labor force and found that more pro-firm laws helped firms and
reduced poverty, while more laws protecting workers increased poverty.
Heckman and Pages highlight the need for using micro data from single
countries. While it is not necessary for these data to come from developing
countries, developing countries often are good contexts to study as there are
large changes in job security provisions either over time or across regions, pro-
viding the necessary identifying variation. Four such studies are Kugler (2004),
Adhvaryu, Chari, and Sharma (2010), Mondino and Montoya (2004), and Saave-
dra and Torero (2004).
Kugler uses micro data on households in Columbia. She uses a difference-
in-differences technique, and also estimates an exponential duration model. She
finds that job security provisions decrease turnover and increase unemploy-
ment.
Adhvaryu et al build on the Besley and Burgess study by investigating
whether firms in Indian states that have more restrictive firing laws are able
to adjust their labor more or less in response to demand shocks. Using rainfall
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shocks as their exogenous variation, they find that firms in less restrictive states
are more able to adjust their employment levels. This finding is consistent with
the standard theoretical prediction.
The other two studies, Mondino and Montoya, and Saavedra and Torero,
use similar methodologies on disaggregated firm level data from Argentina and
Peru, respectively. They estimate labor demand equations in which a direct
measure of the costs of job security is used as a control variable. This measure is
constructed based on the labor taxes firms are required to pay, and the structure
of the severance payment schedule. Both studies find a negative relationship
between job security and employment. One weakness of these studies, which
the authors admit, are the aggregate instruments used to identify the impact of
job security at the firm level.
My research continues the recent trend of using firm level data, though it
builds on the literature by analyzing a specific policy change. This will pro-
vide more focused insight as how a specific job security provision impacts firm
behavior. Also, the difference-in-differences approach follows well established
methods for how to identify the impact of the policy.
Two other important papers in this literature are Abowd and Kramarz (2003)
and Autor (2003). Abowd and Kramarz investigated the existence and magni-
tude of the hiring and separation costs faced by French firms in 1992. They
found that there were virtually no variable hiring costs, except when hiring
highly skilled workers on long-term contracts. They also found that the sep-
aration costs were significantly positive, and consisted of large fixed compo-
nents, indicating that more adjustment should be done on the hiring side and
that separations should be done in bunches. Autor (2003) looked at changes
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in ”Employment at Will” laws on the use of temporary labor and found an in-
crease in the use of temporary labor in states that have imposed restrictions on
Employment at Will doctrine.
2.3 Empirical Approach
Basic economic theory has some straightforward predictions for the impact of
increased firing restrictions on firm behavior. The predictions come from the
standard representation of a firm’s production function,
Y = AKαLβ,
where Y is firm output, K is capital, L is labor, and A is a productivity term. The
capital and labor shares are represented by α and β, respectively. The overall
impact of the labor law is to increase the cost of labor. This will cause the firm to
use less of that more expensive input, L, and more of the other input, K. How-
ever, the law restricts the ability of the firm to reduce its workforce, restricting
the negative effect on L, so the overall prediction for L is ambiguous. The in-
creased costs of production will also lead to lower output. The direct effect of
the policy on labor costs is to increase them, though if enough firms decrease the
amount of labor employed, there could be a general equilibrium effect dragging
down wages for workers.
To understand the impact of the increased firing restrictions contained in
Manpower Law 13/2003, this analysis will use a difference in differences tech-
nique around the implementation year of 2003. I will use the firms that were
more likely to comply with the law as the treatment group and the firms that
were not as likely to comply as the control group. Since the control group will
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be exposed to the treatment to some extent, the measured impact of the policy
change will be combined with the difference in exposure to the law. This com-
bined measurement will be an underestimate of the overall impact of the policy.
There are two different dimensions across which there might be differences in
compliance with the labor law by firms. The first is by firm size, with large
firms being more likely to comply and small firms being more likely to slide
under the radar. Secondly, firms closer to the enforcement office will be more
likely to comply.
There is some research documenting the likelihood of compliance amongst
Indonesian firms. Harrison and Scorse document that manufacturing firms ex-
posed to foreign interests are more likely to comply with minimum wage laws
(2004 and 2010). They measure foreign influence separately through foreign
ownership and the amount a firm exports. Manning and Roesad also argue that
large firms and foreign-owned firms in Indonesia are more likely to be held in
compliance to labor laws (2007). Large firms tend to have greater foreign ex-
posure, which supports the identification of the first treatment group. I also
explicitly do not include foreign owned firms in the control group as predicted
impact on them would be mixed.
There have also been other studies that have used firm size as a determinant
in compliance with Labor Laws. Chay (1998) studied the impact of extend-
ing the Equal Employment Opportunity Act to small firms, and found that the
EEOA had a positive effect on the labor market status of African-Americans.
Carrington, McCue and Pierce (2000) looked at the differential impact of Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to employers of different sizes. They found that
minorities moved to larger employers after the passage of the law. While both of
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these studies examined laws that had specific exemptions for small firms, they
provide support for the argument that governments have different expectations
for compliance for firms of different sizes.
Therefore, the first primary treatment group will be large firms and the cor-
responding control group will be small domestically-owned firms. I exclude
the small foreign owned firms from the analysis as the predicted impact for
them is mixed. I also repeat the analysis using a second identification strat-
egy,identifying the treatment group as firms located in districts which are the
provincial capital. The assumption is that the government is more likely to en-
force the new labor laws on the firms to which it has easy access. The control
group is then firm located in districts which are not the provincial capital 2.
The difference in differences methodology can be represented in the follow-
ing manner.
Yit = Treatit + Postit + αTreat ∗ Postit + Xitβ + it (2.1)
Where Yit is the outcome variable for firm i in year t. Treat is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the firm is a member of the treatment group, and zero otherwise.
Post is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation is after the program has
been implemented. Then Treat ∗ Post is the interaction of the two dummy vari-
ables, which will only be equal to 1 for firms in the treatment group after the
policy has been implemented. Xit is a vector of k control variables, with β be-
ing a vector of k coefficients. The last term, it represents the error term. In
this setup, α captures the impact of the policy change. The analysis below will
present results from a base specification with only year, region, and industry
dummies, and then an additional specification which also includes additional
2I assign all districts in the province of Jakarta to be in the treatment group.
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controls.
The identifying assumption in this approach is that, conditional on a set of
control variables, the only change between before 2003 and afterwards for these
two groups is the change in the labor laws. The main threat to identification
in difference-in-differences analysis is that the treatment and control groups are
experiencing different trends leading up to the policy change. If the groups
experience different pre-treatment trends, the control group’s behavior after the
policy change is no longer a valid counterfactual for treatment group. To check
for this issue, the analysis below will display the trends for the variables of
interest over the study period.
The first approach used in this analysis will compare large firms to small
domestically-owned firms. I follow standard practice and define large firms as
those with at least 250 employees, and small firms as those with less than 50
employees 3. Medium sized firms are excluded from this analysis. The control
group also excludes foreign-owned firms, and again I follow standard practice
by considering a firm to be foreign owned if at least 10% of its capital is for-
eign owned. This strategy is based on the assumption that large and small firms
would have followed the same trends in the absence of the law change, which
might be rather strong as the average large firm is quite different from the aver-
age small domestically owned firm.
Therefore, I consider a second, complementary approach, defining the treat-
ment group as those firms located in the same district as the provincial capi-
tal. The motivation behind the approach is the same, that some firms are more
likely to comply with the law than others. This second approach also allows
3As a robustness check, I consider small firms to be those with less than 30 employees, and
large firms to have at least 100 employees.
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me to consider a refinement of the difference in differences methodology pro-
posed by Blundell and Costa-Dias (2000). They suggest matching each firm in
the treatment group to the most similar firm in the control group. This changes
the assumption to say that the firms in the control and treatment groups that
are most similar in terms of their observables are also most likely to be similar
in their unobservables. To implement this, I use a probit regression to predict
the probability that each firm is located in the district with the provincial cap-
ital, and then match each treated firm with three firms not in a district with
a capital, but had the closest probabilities to being located there. This match-
ing approach improves on the standard difference in differences methodology
by more strategically defining the control group which will have more similar
trends in unobservables.
Firms are allocated into treatment and control groups based on their average
values for the pre-treatment period (2000-2002). Also, the observations from
2003 are not used in the analysis to provide a more clear distinction between
the before and after environments. The law became effective in March of 2003
which means I might miss some of the short term responses of firms, but I am
more interested in the long term responses of the firms. This is partly because
my data is not granular enough to study the short term effects, but also because
the longer term responses provide evidence of the structural changes that have
occurred in the labor market.
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullianathan (2004) also discuss an issue with using
difference-in-differences techniques. They show that many effects may be er-
roneously shown to be significant because of the serial correlation in analyzed
variables. However, their Monte-Carlo simulations shows that this issue be-
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comes less significant as the number of years used in the analysis shrinks. One
of their recommendations for dealing with this issue is to flatten the data by
separately pooling all of the years together before and after the policy change.
With only six years of data used in my analysis, this issue does not pose too
much of a threat.
Another concern about drawing inference from difference-in-differences
analysis based on ordinary least squares is a concern here. Donald and Lang
(2007) demonstrate that the standard asymptotics are not valid when the num-
ber of groups is small. There are only two groups in this analysis, the treatment
group and the control group. They propose a two-step procedure that provides
unbiased estimates for the variances of the coefficients. However, they also state
that if there are large numbers of observations within each group, which is the
case here, that feasible GLS estimation will produce unbiased estimates. There-
fore, I use feasible GLS estimation in each of the specifications reported below.
2.4 Data
The data I use for this analysis is Indonesia’s Annual Manufacturing Survey,
Survei Tahunan Perusahaan Industri Pengolahan. It is a census of all the manufac-
turing establishments in Indonesia with at least 20 employees. The firms are
required to fill out the survey each year, and I have data covering years 2000-
2006. This panel dataset includes many variables, but importantly for this study,
it has data on output (revenue), inputs, capital, wages, number of employees,
ownership, location, industry, etc. A few years of data have more detailed infor-
mation, such was the education level of the workforce, or the percent of output
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exported. I include some of these variables in the summary statistics for infor-
mational purposes, but because of the variables’ inconsistent availability I do
not include them in the analysis.
Since prices are different for consumers than they are for industries, I de-
flate wages using Indonesia’s consumer price index to constant 2000 Rupiah
and I deflate all other monetary values using industry specific wholesale price
indices to constant 2000 Rupiah. The exchange rate in the year 2000 was about
8,400 Rupiah to 1USD. The question in the survey on establishment ownership
asks how much of the firm’s capital is owned by the local government, central
government, foreign interests, or private interests. I follow the standard practice
of considering a firm to be foreign-owned if at least 10% of its capital is foreign
owned.
I performed some basic data cleaning procedures following other studies
that have used the Indonesian SI data (Blalock and Gertler 2004, Hallward-
Driemeier and Rijkers 2010). This included correcting for invalid values, miss-
ing values, and outliers. Observations were considered invalid if they were per-
centage variables with values outside the range 0-100, for example a firm with
320 percent of its output exported. Missing values were cleaned if they were
surrounded by actual values in both the previous and following years. Obser-
vations were considered to be outliers if they were significantly different from
both the previous and following values. I followed the Hallward-Driemeier and
Rijkers thresholds for determining when observations were significantly differ-
ent. In each of these cases, observations were replaced with the mean of the
corresponding values from the previous and following years. When an obser-
vation was on a boundary, only the previous or following year was used for
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cleaning purposes. If suitable neighbors were not found, the missing or invalid
data was left in the sample.
I have data on the number of production workers and non-production work-
ers. Production workers are those working in the production activities of the
firm, and non-production workers comprise everyone else, such as manage-
ment and administrative staff. Since over 84% of workers are production work-
ers, I focus the analysis on them. The data also contains information on total
salary and benefits paid to workers. I add these together to construct the total
labor costs to the firm, and then divide by the number of workers to yield the
average wage paid by the firm to each of its workers. However, I will also use
the salary and benefits components of wages as distinct outcome variables to
see if the policy change had a differential impact on the various components
of worker pay. Theory would predict that the law change required the bene-
fits portion to increase, so the firm would compensate by decreasing the salary
component, to keep the overall labor cost the same.
Summary statistics for the data can be found in Table 2.1. Each observation
is a firm-year. Summary statistics for all firms are found in the first column.
The next column contains statistics for all large firms (at least 250 employees),
the third columns shows the means for firms that are both small and domesti-
cally owned. The second and third columns comprise the treatment and control
groups for the first approach to identifying the treatment and control groups
for the analysis. Column 4 then shows the summary statistics for all firms in
districts which also have the provincial capital. These firms are the treatment
group for both the second and third set of analyses. The control group for the
second approach are firms not located in the district with the provincial capital,
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and these results are shown in column 5. The last column shows the summary
statistics for the matched control group, firms not in the district with the provin-
cial capital, but have a high predicted probability to be located there.
The first row shows the continuous version of the foreign ownership vari-
able, and it shows that large firms do have greater foreign ownership. Also,
firms that are classified as not being foreign owned may still have a small bit of
foreign influence, though it appears to be minor. There are large differences in
the averages reported in columns 2 and 3, which suggests that while there may
be different levels of compliance between the large and small firms, there are
many other differences which may preclude a clean analysis of the treatment
effect. There are not as large of differences between the treatment and control
groups as identified by their proximity to the provincial capital. These results
are shown in columns 4 and 5. The firms near the provincial capital are older,
smaller, export less, have greater revenues, and pay higher wages. The matched
control group in column 6 shows means which are closer to the treatment group,
which shows the matching process has selected firms which are more like those
in the treatment group.
2.5 Results
This analysis will primarily focus on four outcome variables that measure out-
comes for the various sides in the debate over firing restrictions. I use the natu-
ral log of firm revenue to measure the impact of firing restrictions on the firm. I
use the number of production workers employed by the firm and average wages
paid by the firm to production workers as measures of how the policy impacts
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the labor market. I also look at how the policy impacts the capital-labor ratio of
the firm, to measure how much firms are able to substitute capital for labor after
the costs of labor are increased. I use the employment and wages of production
workers as they comprise the majority of the workforce, and are the ones most
likely impacted by the policy change. I also break down the impact of the policy
on the salary and benefit components of wages.
As discussed above, when using difference in differences analysis, it is im-
portant to compare the trends of the groups before the policy change. In order
for the analysis to work, the pre-treatment trends facing the treatment and con-
trol groups need to be similar. These trends are displayed in Figures 1-3 for the
six outcome variables. In each panel of the figure, the trends are displayed for
the both the treatment and controls groups relative to the mean value for each
outcome in the first year used in the analysis, 2000. Figure 1 shows the results
using the identification approach based on firm size. Figure 2 shows the results
for the identification based on location, and Figure 3 uses the matched control
group.
I will walk through the figures for each outcome variable, starting with
the output (revenue) of the firm. In all three identification strategies, the pre-
treatment trends for the treatment and control groups track each other pretty
well. The trends then start to separate in 2003 in both Figure 1 and 3, with the
treatment group having smaller increases in output than the control group. This
negative impact of the policy on the output of the firm coincides with the the-
oretical prediction, however this analysis is of unconditional trends, and there
may be other characteristics of the groups that could explain the change in out-
put.
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The second outcome is employment, which is found in the upper right cor-
ner of each figure. Figure 1 shows a discrepancy in 2001, but also that the trends
are moving in opposite directions from 2003 onwards. Figures 2 and 3 show
trends for the treatment and control groups tracking each other, but starting to
separate in 2002, with the control group having lower levels of employment
growth. This early break in the trend is cause for concern, and suggests that
the environment for the two groups changed for a reason different from the
law change. Its also possible that the treatment firms were anticipating the law
change, and reducing their workforce before it became more expensive to do so.
The third outcome is wages, the sum of salary and benefits. For this variable,
all three figures show a similar pattern, with wages growing faster for firms in
the treatment group, however the trends started to separate in 2002. This could
also be due to the firms anticipating the law change. If firms were indeed an-
ticipating the policy change, and not responding to some other event, the dif-
ference in differences results reported below will understate the overall impact
of the policy. The bottom row of each figure shows the breakdown of wages
into salary and benefits. The trends for salary closely match that for the total
wage, which is expected as salary is the major component of wages for these
workers. The trend shown in Figure 1 shows benefits decreasing in the treat-
ment firms, which is counter to how we would expect firms to respond to the
policy. Though, this is just the unconditional trend. The important point to note
here is that the trends started to separate in 2002, supporting the idea of firms
anticipating the law change. The trends in benefits in Figures 2 and 3 show the
trends tracking each other pretty well, until 2006, when the treatment group has
a dramatic decrease in benefits, which could potentially skew the analysis.
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The last variable to consider is the capital-labor ratio. The trends for this
variable are pretty similar in all three figures, with a separation in the trends
starting in 2002, the year before the policy change.
The simplest way to conduct difference-in-differences analysis is to compare
the means for the treatment and control groups both before and after the pol-
icy change. However, these results do not account for any differences in the
distribution of firms across industry or region, nor do they control for any firm
specific variables that may be directly impacting the outcome. To condition for
these other variables, equation 1 is estimated via ordinary least squares. The
results of these regressions are reported separately by outcome variable in Ta-
bles 2.2-2.7. In each table, the first two columns report the results using the
identification approach based on firm size. The third and fourth columns re-
port the results using firm location to identify the treatment and control groups,
and the last two columns using the matched control group. In each table, the
odd numbered columns report the results using only year, industry, and region
dummies as controls in the regression4, whereas the even numbered columns in-
clude additional controls. The additional controls used are based on a standard
production function formulation, and depend on which outcome is considered.
Table 2.2 displays the results for firm output. The prediction is that the in-
creased severance payments would reduce firm output as firms need to adjust
to the increased labor costs. The impact of the policy is captured by the coef-
ficient on the interaction term, Treated ∗ Post − 2003. In the first two columns,
there is a negative and statistically significant coefficient, confirming the theo-
retical prediction. However, the results in columns 3 and 4 yield positive and
statistically significant results. These conflicting results say that large firms in-
4There are 32 regions and 20 two-digit industries.
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crease their output more slowly than the small-domestically owned firms, but
the firms located in the same district as the provincial capital increase their out-
put more so than the firms located in other districts. One explanation for these
results is that the firms located in the provincial capital are smaller on average
than the other firms. So in both approaches, the group with smaller firms had
the higher growth in output.
The last two columns in Table 2.2 report the results by location, but using the
matched control group. The treatment effect in these regressions is insignificant.
This analysis is potentially superior to the approach used in columns 3 and 4, as
the control group is strategically constructed to be a more appropriate counter-
factual. In this case, the policy positively impacts output in firms located in the
provincial capital as compared to all other firms, but has no impact as compared
to firms in other districts that are most similar to the firms in the capital. How-
ever, neither of the geographical approaches supports the theoretical prediction
of the increased labor costs leading to decreased output.
I next examine the impact of the increased severance payments on the num-
ber of production workers employed at each firm. These results are reported
in Table 2.3. In all six regressions, the treatment effect is negative, and is sta-
tistically significant in 5 of the specifications. The theoretical prediction for the
impact of job security provisions on employment is ambiguous, but these re-
sults show that for firms in the manufacturing sector in Indonesia, the overall
impact of the policy on employment is negative. A common explanation for
this type of result is that it’s due to firms decreasing their hiring more than they
decreased their firing. The magnitude of these coefficients suggest that the pol-
icy reduced employment of production workers about 5 or 6% (focusing on the
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results including the additional controls).
The third outcome variable is the average wage the firm pays their pro-
duction workers. These results are reported in Table 2.4. In all six specifica-
tions, the treatment effect is positive, which supports the predicted impact. The
law change mandates an increase in the benefits firms are required to pay their
workers. While firms could reduce the salary portion of the wages to compen-
sate for the increased benefits, leaving the overall cost the same, it is often very
difficult for firms to reduce wages as workers dislike paycuts. The size of the
impact of the policy change is about a 4 to 8% increase in wages.
As mentioned above, this policy change might impact the salary and benefit
components of wages differently. This prediction analyzed in Tables 2.5 and 2.6,
with Table 2.5 showing the impact on salary and Table 2.6 showing the impact
on benefits. One potential issue with this analysis is that while the firms are
supposed to set aside funds to be prepared to pay workers their severance pay-
ments, it is possible that firms do not report these funds in the benefits portion
of the survey. Table 2.5 reports a positive treatment effect in all six specifications,
whereas Table 2.6 has mixed results for the effect on benefits.
The positive impact on salary could be due to the changes in the minimum
wage law which were also a part of Labor Law 13. However, I include con-
trols for the minimum wage in the province in each of the even columns, and
the positive treatment effect on salary remains5. The minimum wage increases
steadily throughout this period, though there is not a break in the trend in 2003.
However, the minimum wage data is only at the provence-year level, and may
be missing some of the changes at the district level that were enabled by the law
5I thank David Newhouse at the World Bank for generously providing the minimum wage
data.
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change.
The first two columns of Table 2.6 report a negative relationship between
the policy and benefits, but the other four columns report positive effects. The
predicted impact is positive, so the negative coefficient is troubling. It could be
that the large firms have some other factor influencing the amount of benefits
they pay, such as a decrease in health care costs.
The last outcome variable considered is the capital-labor ratio, and these re-
sults are report in Table 2.7. The treatment effect is positive and statistically sig-
nificant on all six specifications, though the magnitude of the coefficient varies
some. The positive effect is consistent with the theoretical prediction, that firms
would use relatively more capital and less labor as the cost of labor increases.
The magnitude of the effect ranges from 8% to 25%.
I performed a few variations on the above analysis to check the robustness
of the results. These results are reported in Table 2.8. The specifications are the
same as those used in the main results, however, the table just reports the results
for the coefficient on the treatment effect. The first check I consider was to assign
firms to the treatment and control groups based on their size in a different year.
The main analysis assigned firms based on their average size between 2000-
2002, however its possible that the firms were anticipating the law change and
adjusting their size prior to the law being passed. The trends shown in the
figures above support this possibility since the trends start to separate in 2002,
the year before the law was implemented. To check the sensitivity of the year of
assignment, I assign firms based on their size in the year 1999. These results are
reported in the first two columns. Column 2 includes all of the controls, and the
all of the signs of the results match the main results above, though the negative
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effect on employment is no longer significant.
The next check I perform is to assign firms to treatment and control groups
using different size cutoffs. The main analysis considers small firms to have
less than 50 employees, and large firms to have at least 250. Here I consider
small firms to have less than 30 employees, and large firms to have at least
100. A firm with 100 employees is a good sized firm, and may be big enough
to be on the radar of the local labor inspector. It is also important to note that
firms with less than 20 employees are not included in this data, so the control
group here consists of firms with 20 to 30 employees. The results using these
smaller cutoffs are reported in columns 3 and 4. The sign of the coefficients
in column 4, which include all of the additional firm controls, match the main
results, however the coefficient for the impact of the policy on employment is
no longer significant. This suggests that the employment result report above is
sensitive to the specification chosen.
The last check considers a variation on the second identification approach,
considering firms to be treated not only if they are in the same district as the
provincial capital, but also if they are in a neighboring district. These results are
presented in the last two columns of Table 2.8. The signs of the coefficients in
column 6 match the main results, except for the coefficient on output. The main
output results were mixed, with the identification based on firm size reporting
a negative relationship, but the identification based on location reporting a pos-
itive coefficient. So, the positive result in the robustness check, using all firms
near the capital, supports the result based on firm size.
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2.6 Conclusion
This paper has used difference-in-differences analysis to study the impact of
a package of labor laws implemented in Indonesia in 2003. The most signif-
icant changes in the law increased firing restrictions, decentralized minimum
wage setting, and placed restrictions on how contract workers could be used.
I used data from Indonesia’s census of manufacturing firms from 2000 to 2006
to analyze the impact of the law on the behavior of firms and the labor market.
To establish treatment and control groups for the analysis, I argued that some of
the firms were more likely to comply with the law than others, whether through
their own volition or through government enforcement.
I considered two dimensions along which compliance may differ, firm size
and firm location. The first approach assumed that large firms complied with
the new law, whereas the small, domestically owned firms did not. The second
approach assumed that firms located in the same district as the provincial capi-
tal were more likely to comply with the new law, whereas firms in other districts
might not.
The results showed that the policy had a negative impact on firm out-
put when identifying the impact by firm size, and no impact when using the
matched control group. There was a positive effect on the wages of production
workers and on the capital-labor ratio of the firm. There were mixed results
on the employment of a firm, with the main results reporting a negative effect,
though the result was sensitive to the specification assumptions. There were
also mixed results for the impact on firm output and the benefits paid by the
firm. These results suggest that firms are trying to transition towards relatively
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more capital intensive production processes. As the firms transition, however,
their output levels are about 4.5% less than what they would have been had the
law not been enacted. The law is not having a negative impact on the wages
of workers however, as the wages paid to production workers increased some-
where between 4 and 8%.
This work provides relevant information to the policy discussion about the
impact of job security provisions on both sides of the labor market. While wages
are increased for production workers, the number of workers employed may
fall. Also, there is a negative impact on the output of firms, which may disap-
pear in the long run as firms adjust their input mix, but the international firms
may also move to other lower cost countries. More work needs to be done to
quantify the magnitudes of these various effects.
77
Figure 2.1: Trends in Outcome Variables Separated by Firm Size
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Figure 2.2: Trends in Outcome Variables Separated by Firm Location
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Figure 2.3: Trends in Outcome Variables Separated by Firm Location with a
Matched Control Group
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Indonesian Manufacturing Establishments
All Large Small-Dom In Not In Matched
Firms Firms Firms Capital Capital Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
%Foreign 5.80 15.86 0.09 5.01 6.04 6.16
Output (Bn-Rph) 25.36 106.37 1.60 28.04 24.53 26.88
Input (Bn-Rph) 15.95 65.54 1.05 17.23 15.56 17.99
Investment(Bn-Rph) 1.89 4.42 0.23 1.01 2.16 1.98
Capital(Bn-Rph) 14.82 44.57 0.76 8.66 16.76 14.18
% Exported 12.99 28.65 5.89 11.20 13.54 12.13
R&D Exp.(Mn-Rph) 5.01 24.99 0.24 6.48 4.55 5.87
VA/L (Mn-Rph) 31.04 46.86 17.62 34.04 30.10 33.61
Age 16.94 18.32 16.82 17.78 16.66 17.06
#Emp 193.66 774.40 29.93 179.45 198.06 198.46
%Prod 84.41 84.64 85.64 82.83 84.89 83.14
Wage - Prod (Th-Rph) 5,036 6,313 4,204 5,929 4,759 5,193
Wage - Non-Prod (Th-Rph) 10,638 18,841 6,211 11,829 10,243 11,115
Prod Salary (Th-Rph) 4,503 5,377 3,901 5,322 4,249 4,584
Prod Benefits (Th-Rph) 435 819 218 485 420 536
Num 139,043 25,944 60,795 32,897 106,146 20,191
Notes: All values are in constant 2000 Rupiah. Data covers years 2000 - 2006. The export data is
available for years 2000, 2004, and 2006. The R&D expenditure information is available for a few
firms in years 2000 and 2006.
Table 2.2: Difference in Differences Results for Firm Output
By Firm Size By Location Matched Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated 3.655*** 0.376*** 0.202*** 0.105*** 0.144*** 0.069***
(0.020) (0.027) (0.024) (0.013) (0.031) (0.017)
Post-2003 0.239*** 0.180*** 0.163*** 0.363*** 0.231*** 0.507***
(0.019) (0.023) (0.023) (0.033) (0.044) (0.062)
Treated * Post-2003 -0.110*** -0.045** 0.052* 0.046*** -0.015 0.036
(0.029) (0.020) (0.031) (0.017) (0.042) (0.024)
ln (Min Wage) -0.051 -0.108** -0.230***
(0.057) (0.047) (0.068)
ln (Total Jobs) 0.992*** 1.079*** 1.145***
(0.009) (0.005) (0.007)
ln (Capital) 0.198*** 0.219*** 0.180***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
constant 14.903*** 8.784*** 15.379*** 9.275*** 14.332*** 10.578***
(0.172) (0.764) (0.223) (0.600) (0.272) (0.864)
r2 0.673 0.797 0.157 0.730 0.110 0.726
N 52,006 51,731 84,547 84,052 31,868 31,808
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample consists of all treated and control firms
for the years 2000-2002 and 2004-2006. All models include year, region, and industry effects.
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Table 2.3: Difference in Differences Results for Employment
By Firm Size By Location Matched Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated 2.707*** 1.695*** 0.045*** -0.050*** 0.051*** -0.016
(0.011) (0.016) (0.015) (0.009) (0.019) (0.012)
Post-2003 0.051*** -0.001 0.080*** -0.115*** 0.106*** -0.182***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.027) (0.029) (0.036)
Treated * Post-2003 -0.085*** -0.065*** -0.020 -0.048*** -0.060** -0.061***
(0.017) (0.014) (0.020) (0.012) (0.027) (0.017)
ln (Min Wage) -0.078** -0.039 0.035
(0.031) (0.032) (0.046)
ln (Capital) 0.036*** 0.084*** 0.077***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
ln (Output) 0.249*** 0.429*** 0.451***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Constant 3.437*** 0.313 4.795*** -3.237*** 4.579*** -4.034***
(0.081) (0.408) (0.124) (0.407) (0.169) (0.590)
r2 0.794 0.850 0.103 0.653 0.085 0.666
N 51,998 51,724 84,539 84,045 31,864 31,804
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample consists of all treated and control firms
for the years 2000-2002 and 2004-2006. All models include year, region, and industry effects.
Table 2.4: Difference in Differences Results for Wages of Production Workers
By Firm Size By Location Matched Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated 0.390*** -0.269*** 0.121*** 0.091*** 0.125*** 0.108***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Post-2003 0.043*** -0.008 0.031*** 0.138*** 0.029** 0.223***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.015) (0.012) (0.028)
Treated * Post-2003 0.020** 0.037*** 0.090*** 0.082*** 0.068*** 0.069***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.012) (0.010)
ln (Min Wage) 0.029 0.007 0.000
(0.026) (0.022) (0.031)
ln (Capital) 0.018*** 0.012*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
ln (Output) 0.166*** 0.136*** 0.114***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Constant 8.865*** 5.867*** 8.964*** 6.327*** 8.847*** 6.733***
(0.074) (0.355) (0.073) (0.276) (0.117) (0.391)
r2 0.313 0.441 0.244 0.423 0.234 0.390
N 52,006 51,731 84,547 84,052 31,868 31,808
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample consists of all treated and control
firms for the years 2000-2002 and 2004-2006. All models include year, region, and industry
effects.
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Table 2.5: Difference in Differences Results for the Salary of Production Workers
By Firm Size By Location Matched Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated 0.283*** -0.302*** 0.112*** 0.087*** 0.120*** 0.107***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Post-2003 0.040*** 0.008 0.079*** 0.036*** 0.307*** 0.004
(0.008) (0.014) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
Treated * Post-2003 0.061*** 0.077*** 0.094*** 0.087*** 0.073*** 0.072***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
ln (Min Wage) 0.061** 0.023 0.030
(0.026) (0.022) (0.031)
ln (Capital) 0.011*** 0.004*** 0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
ln (Output) 0.151*** 0.117*** 0.095***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Constant 8.750*** 5.577*** 8.675*** 6.509*** 8.446*** 6.806***
(0.070) (0.349) (0.075) (0.290) (0.102) (0.405)
r2 0.275 0.384 0.233 0.366 0.235 0.341
N 52,002 51,727 84,539 84,044 31,866 31,806
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample consists of all treated and control
firms for the years 2000-2002 and 2004-2006. All models include year, region, and industry
effects.
Table 2.6: Difference in Differences Results for the Benefits of Production Workers
By Firm Size By Location Matched Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated 1.216*** 0.057** 0.290*** 0.234*** 0.272*** 0.234***
(0.018) (0.025) (0.017) (0.015) (0.022) (0.019)
Post-2003 -0.354*** -0.308*** -0.275*** -0.159*** -0.119*** 0.049
(0.042) (0.061) (0.031) (0.023) (0.034) (0.047)
Treated * Post-2003 -0.281*** -0.279*** 0.079*** 0.085*** 0.058* 0.071**
(0.029) (0.027) (0.024) (0.022) (0.033) (0.030)
ln (Min Wage) -0.040 -0.005 -0.047
(0.070) (0.055) (0.076)
ln (Capital) 0.082*** 0.078*** 0.068***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
ln (Output) 0.252*** 0.263*** 0.235***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
Constant 6.588*** 2.740*** 7.612*** 1.578** 6.664*** 2.831***
(0.198) (0.936) (0.219) (0.729) (0.395) (1.050)
r2 0.313 0.392 0.187 0.377 0.141 0.325
N 34,310 34,115 55,682 55,309 21,488 21,436
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample consists of all treated and control firms
for the years 2000-2002 and 2004-2006. All models include year, region, and industry effects.
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Table 2.7: Difference in Differences Results for the Capital/Labor Ratio
By Firm Size By Location Matched Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated 0.124*** -0.713*** 0.023 0.000 -0.019 -0.020
(0.024) (0.032) (0.020) (0.020) (0.026) (0.026)
Post-2003 0.104*** -0.067** 0.160*** -0.039 0.104*** -0.193**
(0.023) (0.034) (0.019) (0.050) (0.037) (0.096)
Treated * Post-2003 0.231*** 0.252*** 0.107*** 0.079*** 0.116*** 0.093***
(0.032) (0.031) (0.025) (0.026) (0.035) (0.035)
ln (Min Wage) 0.392*** 0.370*** 0.415***
(0.086) (0.070) (0.108)
ln (Output) 0.229*** 0.161*** 0.091***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.005)
Constant 8.611*** 0.319 9.187*** 1.690* 8.879*** 1.735
(0.294) (1.162) (0.247) (0.912) (0.370) (1.391)
r2 0.100 0.134 0.095 0.129 0.092 0.103
N 52,006 51,731 84,547 84,052 31,868 31,808
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample consists of all treated and control
firms for the years 2000-2002 and 2004-2006. All models include year, region, and industry
effects.
Table 2.8: Summary of Difference in Differences Results for Robustness
Checks
Pre Assignment Diff Size Cutoffs Near Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Output 0.054* -0.043** -0.155*** -0.078*** 0.024 -0.013
(0.029) (0.021) (0.025) (0.019) (0.031) (0.017)
Job Prod 0.023 -0.006 -0.101*** -0.055*** 0.009 -0.013
(0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.020) (0.012)
Prod Wage 0.035*** 0.020** 0.019* 0.039*** 0.055*** 0.051***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
Prod Salary 0.076*** 0.065*** 0.052*** 0.070*** 0.052*** 0.049***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
Prod Benefits -0.213*** -0.272*** -0.277*** -0.258*** 0.082*** 0.105***
(0.031) (0.029) (0.027) (0.025) (0.024) (0.022)
Cap/Lab 0.402*** 0.384*** 0.215*** 0.243*** 0.125*** 0.114***
(0.035) (0.034) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample consists of all treated and control
firms for the years 2000-2002 and 2004-2006. Only the coefficient on the treatment effect
is reported.
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CHAPTER 3
POVERTY AND MONOPSONY: EVIDENCE FROM THE INDONESIAN
LABOR MARKET
3.1 Introduction
Industrialization is often seen as an engine of growth that will help lift people
out of poverty. The jobs that people are able to get in formal labor markets
tend to have both higher and more stable wages than what they could earn in
agriculture or the informal sector. As the industrial sector grows in an economy,
people leave the agricultural sector to find jobs in manufacturing plants. Along
with the new job, comes better pay which allows the worker to increase the
standard of living for their household. This pattern has occurred in both Korea
and Taiwan, and is happening in China and Indonesia.
Indonesia’s GDP per capita has increased five-fold in the last 40 years, and
its poverty rate has declined by over 40 percentage points in the last 25 years 1.
Some of this decline in poverty in Indonesia can be attributed to the growth of its
manufacturing sector. In the last 25 years, the manufacturing sector has created
over 14 million new jobs. The average yearly wage of a manufacturing worker
in Indonesia is US$ 1,819, which alone is enough to support a family of three
above the poverty line. With over 14 million new jobs, this roughly suggests
that 43% of the poverty reduction in Indonesia over the last 25 years has been
due to people getting jobs in the manufacturing sector. These numbers reflect
amazing progress for Indonesia, however, could they have been even better?
1All figures referenced in this section are based on the author’s calculations using data from
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and from Indonesia’s manufacturing census
(SI). The poverty line used is US$1.25 converted at purchasing power parity rates.
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That is, could Indonesia’s process of industrialization have lifted even more
people out of poverty? Industrialization might have had a bigger impact on
poverty if the jobs paid higher wages or if the jobs were more geographically
dispersed. This paper investigates the impact of another factor, the competitive-
ness of the labor market. Recent work has shown that 60% of the manufacturing
firms in Indonesia are sourcing labor monopsonistically (Brummund, this vol-
ume). This implies firms are paying lower wages and hiring fewer workers
than they would if they sourced labor competitively. This paper will quantify
how many more people could have been lifted out of poverty in Indonesia if the
labor markets were perfectly competitive.
Using firm-year level estimates for each firm’s market power, this paper will
calculate the implied deadweight loss for each firm. I will then estimate what
the wage and employment levels would have been for each firm if they hired
labor competitively. These estimates are then taken to household data where
I calculate how many more people would have been able to work their way
out of poverty through industrialization if the labor markets were not monop-
sonistic. This exercise has not been possible previously as the evidence for the
monopsonistic behavior of firms was not granular enough to facilitate the link
to household consumption.
The next section provides a brief literature review. Section three explains the
empirical methods used for the analysis. Section four describes the data, and
section five presents the results in three sub-sections, market power, deadweight
loss, and poverty. Section six concludes and provides a brief policy discussion.
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3.2 Literature
This research is connected to two main sets of literature. First, this paper ex-
amines a common theme in the development literature on the importance of
industrialization in the development of an economy, and the associated reduc-
tion in poverty. The second literature discusses the link between competition
policy and poverty.
There have been many papers discussing both the theoretical foundations
for the role of industrialization in economic development, and also empirical
evidence for the phenomenon. Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) discusses the role of
industrialization in the context of a “big-push”, where the development of the
industrial sector creates its own demand for goods produced by the industrial
sector as the newly employed workers have higher incomes with which they
demand additional goods. Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) extend this idea
by showing that multiple equilibria are possible, both a non-industrial economy
and an industrialized economy, depending the parameter values.
Rostow (1960) more directly discusses the role of industrialization in the de-
velopment of an economy, with each of his five stages being described in rela-
tionship to the nature of industrialization in the economy. The stages go from
no industrialization, to advancement of a few industries, and then diversifica-
tion and wide-spread growth. Its not too difficult to see examples of this pat-
tern throughout history, starting with the Industrial Revolution in England, and
more recently with Korea and China.
There have also been more formal analyses of the impact of industrialization
on poverty. The 1990 World Development Report (WDR) focused on poverty
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and the progress that had occurred up till then at reducing poverty. The re-
port describes how poverty alleviation has been achieved through two primary
means, harnessing the most valuable asset of the poor, their labor, and also
through the increased provision of basic social services to the poor. One of
the background papers for the 1990 WDR examined more specifically how the
wages for unskilled workers changed throughout industrialization (Polak and
Williamson 1991). They find that real wages for unskilled workers grow more
slowly initially, but then grow proportionately with the rest of the economy as
industrialization progresses.
A recent study has found evidence for the “big push” proposed by
Rosenstein-Rodan. Magruder (2011) examines changes in the minimum wage
in Indonesia over the 1990’s. He finds that formal employment increases
in response to higher minimum wages, along with demand for locally pro-
duced products, which supports the idea of a coordinated move from a non-
industrialized equilibrium to an industrialized one.
The second literature that I build on is work dealing more directly with the
link between competition and poverty. Rodriguez-Castelan (2011) examines the
theoretical link between product market concentration and poverty. He finds
conditions for which higher market concentration could both lower or raise the
poverty index, though the conditions for higher market concentration leading
to higher levels of poverty are more realistic.
Goto (2011) studies the optimal minimum wage for poverty reduction, and
finds that the optimal minimum wage is only equal to the competitive wage in
certain special cases. Typically, the optimal minimum wage is higher than the
competitive wage. Two other papers have also studied the relationship between
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minimum wage and poverty, finding that the impacts of a minimum wage pol-
icy depends on the employment composition of the household (Fields and Kan-
bur 2007; Fields, Han and Kanbur 2007).
This paper builds on these literatures by providing, to my knowledge, the
first empirical evidence for the relationship between competition policy and
poverty. This paper also shows how industrialization could have had even
larger impacts on poverty if the labor market was more competitive.
3.3 Empirical Approach
3.3.1 Market Power
Joan Robinson is credited with first discussing the idea of imperfect competition
in labor markets (1933). This analysis has been incorporated into many intro-
ductory economics textbooks and is the complement of the standard monopoly
treatment. This static treatment of monopsony says that firms will set wages
where R′(L) = W(L) + W ′(L)L, with R′(L) being the marginal revenue product
of labor, and the right hand side is the marginal cost of labor with W(L) being
the inverse labor supply curve. The difference between this condition and the
classic competitive treatment is that the wage is a function of labor, L, and not
constant. From here, Pigou’s measure of monopsonistic behavior2 is given as:
E =
R′(L) −W(L)
W(L)
. (3.1)
2This measure is analogous to the Lerner Index used to measure product market power.
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It is easy to show that E = −1, where  is the elasticity of the labor supply curve3.
In the competitive framework, firms hire up to the point where R′(L) = W, which
implies that Pigou’s measure would be equal to zero, and the elasticity would
be infinity. If firms are behaving monopsonistically, W ′(L)L > 0 and then Pigou’s
measure is strictly positive.
Since it is common for establishment data to have information on wages
paid to workers, the key step in generating this measure of market power is to
develop a credible estimate for the marginal revenue product of labor (MRPL)
for firms. This paper follows the work of Brummund (this volume), where a
technique for estimating MRPL was developed and tested. The general idea of
the approach is to estimate a firm’s production function and then evaluate the
derivative of the production function at each firms’ current levels of revenue
and employment to get a firm-year specific measure of MRPL. To estimate the
production function, I use methods based on Blundell and Bond’s System GMM
estimator for dynamic panel data models (1998, 2000). I will briefly explain the
standard approach for estimating production functions, and then explain why
its necessary to use the dynamic panel data method for this analysis.
The literature often represents the production function of a firm with a Cobb-
Douglas specification or a transcendental-logarithmic (trans-log) form. Brum-
mund (this volume) has shown that the trans-log form does not fit the Indone-
sian data well, so I focus on the Cobb-Douglas specification here. The Cobb-
Douglas takes the form, Yit = AL
βL
it K
βK
it , where Yit is the output of firm i at time t,
Lit is the amount of labor used in production, Kit is capital, and A is total factor
3Let  = WL
′(W)
L(W) . Substitute the first order condition for wages into the equation for E to get
E = W
′(L)L
W(L) = 
−1.
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productivity4. β j is the factor share of factor j ∈ {L,K}. The most direct way to
estimate this is to convert it to logs and estimate the equation:
yit = βLlit + βKkit + it, (3.2)
where the lowercase letters represent the log version of the variable and the
constant term is subsumed into the error term. An OLS estimate of this equation
will lead to biased results as there are factors unobserved to the econometrician
that affect both the firm’s choice of inputs and the firm’s output. These factors
are most often described as firm specific productivity and incorporated into the
model as:
yit = βLlit + βKkit + ωit + νit, (3.3)
with ωit representing firm-specific productivity and νit capturing any measure-
ment error or optimization errors on the part of the firm. A standard way to
estimate this equation was developed by Olley and Pakes (1996), who made as-
sumptions about the timing of the evolution of productivity, capital and labor.
The authors used the investment of the firm to break the endogeneity between
capital and productivity, arguing that the investment decisions were made prior
to the realization of the current productivity shock. Various authors (Levinsohn
and Petrin 2003; Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer 2006) have improved upon this
method, though this strand of approaches does not allow for firms to hire labor
monopsonistically, which makes the choice of labor endogenous with the error
term.
The most direct way to deal with this new form of endogeneity in the pro-
duction function is to instrument for the choice of labor. This naturally leads
to another main approach for estimating production functions, that of Blun-
4The empirical work considers two types of labor, intermediate inputs, and capital as inputs
into the production function, but I focus on just two inputs here for clarity.
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dell and Bond, which generates instruments from within the data itself. Their
technique is based on the work of Anderson and Hsiao (1982) and Arellano
and Bond (1991), who used lagged variables as instruments for first differences
within panel data. Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000) build on this by adding in-
struments for current levels with lagged differences, and combining both sets of
instruments into a system, hence the name System GMM.
I use the Blundell-Bond estimator for three reasons. First, the data set lacks a
reliable instrument for employment, which is necessary in order to implement
the Olley-Pakes based approaches in the presence of monopsony. The Blundell-
Bond approach provides the necessary instrumental variables. Second, because
Indonesia is an emerging economy, there are likely large fixed differences in the
unobserved qualities of firms, which suggests that firm fixed effects are impor-
tant, and the Blundell-Bond method allows the inclusion of firm fixed effects
whereas the Olley-Pakes approaches do not. Third, the Blundell-Bond estima-
tor is considered to be more robust to measurement error (Van Biesebrock 2007),
which is always a concern with large firm-level data sets from developing coun-
tries.
This process generates estimates for the parameters of the production func-
tion. The above process assumes that all firms in the estimation sample share
the same technology, in that I only estimate one βL. To weaken the impact of
this assumption, I estimate the production function separately by four-digit in-
dustries. With these industry specific estimates for the parameters of the Cobb-
Douglas production function, I then generate firm-year specific measures for
the marginal revenue product of each firm as
MRPLit =
∂Yit
∂Lit
=
βˆL jYit
Lit
, (3.4)
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for firm i, year t, and industry j. It is then straightforward to calculate the firm-
year specific measure of market power from equation (3.1).
3.3.2 Deadweight Loss
If firms are behaving monopsonistically, then there is a deadweight loss as a
result of their production decisions. Firms are choosing levels of employment
and wages and that are less than efficient to the economy as a whole. The size
of this deadweight loss can be calculated using the measure of market power
estimated in the previous section, and the observed production choices for each
firm. The key step is to find what the efficient combination of employment and
wages are for each firm (L∗ and W∗ respectively), and then compare those with
the observed choices.
The firm’s optimal combination of employment and wages is found at the
intersection of the marginal revenue curve and the marginal cost curve. In the
labor market, the marginal revenue curve is labor demand curve, and if the
labor market is competitive, the marginal cost curve is the labor supply curve
to the firm. If the labor market is not competitive, then the labor supply curve is
not equal to the marginal cost curve, which leads the firm to choose a different
optimal bundle (Point A on Figure 3.1). However, even if the labor supply curve
to the firm is not competitive (i.e. not flat), it is still efficiency increasing for
the firm to choose the point where the labor demand curve intersects the labor
supply curve (Point B), instead of the marginal cost curve (Point A), as the firm
can sell the output generated by the extra worker for more than what the firm
would have to pay in wages. But it is not optimal from the firm’s perspective to
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hire more than L workers if it is facing an upward sloping labor supply curve,
because it would have to raise the wages of all the existing workers, and the total
additional costs are greater than the additional revenue the firm can generate.
Thus the deadweight loss is equal to the triangle ABC in the Figure 3.1.
To find the efficient combination of employment and wages (L∗ and W∗),
I first need to estimate the parameters of the labor supply and labor demand
curves. The labor demand curve shows the marginal revenue product of labor
for each level of employment at a particular firm. This curve is estimated by
separately regressing the marginal revenue product of labor on employment for
each firm. There is an observation for each year that a firm is in the data set, pro-
viding the sample for each regression. This approach yields one labor demand
curve for each firm, which implies that a firm’s technology does not change over
time. While this is a restrictive assumption, the alternative is to assume that all
of the firms in a particular industry share the same technology, which could
vary over time. I think the differences in productivity across firms are greater
than the differences in productivity within a firm over time, implying that the
assumption of a firms technology not changing over time is more accurate.
The measure of market power, E, is used to determine the labor supply curve
for each firm. And since the measure of market power is captured for each firm
in each year, there is a distinct labor supply curve for each firm in each year.
This implies that a firm’s efficient choice of employment and wage changes from
year to year based on changes in the local labor market, not due to changes in
the firm’s productivity.
The firm specific measure of market power can be expressed as an elasticity,
and using the observed levels of employment and wages, the slope of the labor
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supply curve, β1, can be determined as follows:
E =
∂W
∂L
L
W
MRPL −W
W
=
∂W
∂L
L
W
MRPL −W
L
=
∂W
∂L
= β1
β1 =
MRPL −W
L
. (3.5)
The y-intercept of the labor supply curve, β0, can then be determined:
β0 = W − β1L
β0 = W − MRPL −WL ∗ L
β0 = 2W − MRPL. (3.6)
Letting the labor demand curve be represented as, W(L) = α0 +α1L, the inter-
section of the two curves yields the efficient choices of employment and wages
can be found according to:
W∗ =
β1 ∗ α0 − α1 ∗ β0
β1 − α1 (3.7)
L∗ =
W∗ − β0
β1
. (3.8)
The deadweight loss is then calculated for each firm with market power as
DWL = (1/2)(MRPL −W)(L∗ − L), where MRPL is the value of the labor demand
curve at the actual employment level L.
3.3.3 Poverty
If firms are behaving monopsonistically in the labor market, then both L∗ and
W∗ would be greater than the observed levels of employment and wages. This
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implies that if labor markets operated competitively, more workers would be
employed in the manufacturing sector in Indonesia, and all workers for monop-
sonistic firms would have higher wages. These changes imply that more people
would be above the poverty line, and this section describes how to quantify
exactly how many.
Market power is measured at the firm level, but poverty is determined at
the individual level. Without knowing exactly who works for what firm, I pass
the changes in wages and employment to the individual worker through their
local labor market. This assumption states that if a labor market operated com-
petitively, the workers in that labor market would be the most impacted. Since
market power is determined by both market and firm specific factors (Manning
2003, Brummund, this volume), it would be preferable to connect workers to
specific firms, but that is not possible with the data used in this analysis. I de-
fine the local labor market as the local geographic district (kabupaten), which
is similar to a county in the United States. This implies that a manufacturing
worker in a district could work for any other manufacturing firm in the same
district, but would not be able to move to a different district.
To carry over the implied changes in wages and employment to individ-
uals, I calculate the median change for each district in each year in the firm
data. For wages, I apply the median change in wages to each manufacturing
worker and their household in that district in that year. However, poverty is
commonly measured in developing countries based on each person’s level of
consumption, as there is often a lot of non-market production that contributes
to the household standard of living which is not captured in their measured in-
come. To carry over the increase in wages, I assume that if wages increased by
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25%, than consumption also increased by 25%. For example, if the median firm
with market power in district X in year Y would have paid 25% higher wages
if it hired labor competitively that year, I increased the per capita consumption
every manufacturing workers’ household in district X in year Y by 25%.
It is a little more complicated to carry over the implied changes in employ-
ment, as I need to determine who gets hired. I pick people not currently em-
ployed in manufacturing, but who look most like those employed in manufac-
turing. I use standard propensity score methods to determine who has the high-
est probability to be employed in manufacturing. I run a probit over the whole
sample with an indicator for whether the person is employed in the manufac-
turing sector as the dependent variable. As independent variables, I use infor-
mation about the person themselves, their spouse, their household, as well as
province dummies. For the person, I use their age, sex, education, an indicator
for whether their spouse is present, an indicator for whether they are employed,
and an indicator for self-employment. I use their spouse’s level of education, an
indicator for whether the spouse is employed, and an indicator if the spouse is
employed in manufacturing. For individuals that do not have a spouse, these
spouse variables are set to 0. The spouse variables are then interactions with the
spouse-present variable. This formulation allows all of the observations to be
included, yet still conditioning on information about the spouses. I also use in-
formation about the other members of the household. I use an indicator if other
members (besides themselves and their spouse) are present, controls for the av-
erage years of education for the other members, the total number of people
employed, and the total number of people employed in manufacturing. Each
of these values excludes the respondent and the spouse (if present) in their con-
struction. The household variables are also set to 0 if no other members of the
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household are present. After estimating, I predict each person’s probability of
being employed in the manufacturing sector. I then select the people with the
highest propensity scores, who are not currently employed in manufacturing,
and who consume less than the average manufacturing worker in their district,
to be added to the manufacturing sector. This selection is done separately by
district.
For example, if there were 100 people employed in district X in year Y, and
employment would have increased by 30% if that labor market operated com-
petitively, I pull the 30 people with the highest propensity scores into the man-
ufacturing sector in that district. Since being employed in the manufacturing
sector is usually the household’s primary income source, I first give each house-
hold member the average current consumption of all manufacturing workers
in their district, and then the average competitive consumption. I apply these
changes in steps in order to separate out the wage and employment impacts of
making the labor markets competitive.
I calculate poverty at the individual level, based on household consumption.
I then compare the per capita consumption to the US $1.25 per day poverty
line using Purchasing Power Parity exchange rates. I calculate both the poverty
headcount ratio and the poverty gap indices. Both measures can be represented
using the Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984) class of poverty measures, Pα,
defined as:
Pα =
1
N
H∑
i=1
(z − yi
z
)α
, (3.9)
where N is the number of observations, H is the number of poor people, z is
the poverty line, yi is person i’s income, and α is the sensitivity parameter. The
headcount ratio is P0 and the poverty gap is P1, which takes into account how
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far people are below the poverty line.
I then calculate each poverty measure four times. The first is the actual
poverty measure. The second is the poverty measure after the wages of exist-
ing manufacturing workers have been increased. Third, the poverty measure is
calculated after some people have been pulled into manufacturing employment
from unemployment, but no wages have been increased. Finally, the poverty
measure is calculated after both wages and employment increased. These mea-
sures are calculated separately to identify how much of the overall change in
poverty is due to the increase in wages, or due to the increase in the number of
people employed in the manufacturing sector.
I also use four different poverty lines. The lowest poverty line is the national
poverty line. The next is the more internationally comparable line of $1.25/day,
which I convert to Rupiah using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rates.
The third poverty line I use is the $2.00/day, also converted via PPP. The last,
and highest, poverty line is the $1.25/day poverty line, but converted to Rupiah
using the real exchange rate. Each of the poverty lines provides information
about a slightly different part of the income distribution.
To help understand the relative role of monopsony in determining the level
of poverty in Indonesia, I perform a simple Oaxaca-Blinder (OB) decomposition.
This technique breaks down a difference in outcomes between two groups into
what can be explained by differences in levels of observed factors, and what can
be explained by differences in returns to those factors. A common application of
this technique is to break down the wage gap between males and females. Here,
I use poverty as the outcome variable, and the two different time periods as the
two groups. Therefore, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is able to identify
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how much of the change in poverty between the two periods is due to changes
in observable characteristics, and how much is due to changes in the returns to
those characteristics.
The OB decomposition technique starts with the mean poverty rates in the
two different periods, P¯A and P¯B. Letting the poverty rate be determined by
some set of observable characteristics, Xt for years t = A, B, then Pt = β′tXt +
t. Evaluating this equation at the means for each time period, and taking the
difference yields,
P¯A − P¯B = β′AX¯A − β′BX¯B.
Then add and subtract the counterfactual term β′AX¯B, and rearrange terms to get,
P¯A − P¯B = β′A(X¯A − X¯B) − (βB − βA)′X¯B. (3.10)
The first term on the right side of the equation represents the change in poverty
due to changes in the observable characteristics between the two periods. The
second term captures the change in poverty due to changes in the returns to
the observable characteristics. This exposition used β′AX¯B as the counterfactual,
which implies that βA is the true set of returns to characteristics. However, any
set of β’s could be used to construct the decomposition. In the analysis below, I
use the β’s from a pooled regression that includes all of the years in the sample.
3.4 Data
The data used to calculate market power come from Indonesia’s Annual Manu-
facturing Survey, Survei Tahunan Perusahaan Industri Pengolahan (SI). It is a cen-
sus of all the manufacturing establishments in Indonesia with at least 20 em-
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ployees. Firms are required to fill out the survey each year, and the dataset cov-
ers years 1988-2006. Among the substantial number of variables in the dataset
are the following which I use in this study: output (revenue), intermediate in-
puts, investment, capital, wages, non-wage compensation, number of employ-
ees, ownership, location, industry, etc.
To calculate the impact of market power on poverty, I make use of data from
Indonesia’s Family Life Survey (IFLS). The IFLS data is a privately collected lon-
gitudinal survey in Indonesia, containing detailed information on individuals,
households, and communities. The sample is representative of about 83% of the
Indonesian population in 1993 and contains over 30,000 individuals living in 13
of the 27 provinces in the country. I use data from years 1993 and 2007, the first
and fourth waves of the IFLS survey. The data is a panel, though I do not make
use of that structure for this analysis.
Using the SI data, I constructed an average wage measure for each firm by
adding total wages to total benefits, and then dividing by the number of em-
ployees in each firm. I repeat this step for production and non-production work-
ers, to get the average wage for each type of worker. Since prices are different
for consumers than they are for industries, I deflate wages using Indonesia’s
consumer price index to constant 2000 Rupiah and I deflate all other monetary
values using industry specific wholesale price indices to constant 2000 Rupiah.
The exchange rate in the year 2000 was about 8,400 Rupiah to 1 US Dollar. The
question in the survey on establishment ownership asks how much of the firm’s
capital is owned by the local government, central government, foreign interests,
or private interests.
I performed some basic data cleaning procedures following other studies
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that have used the Indonesian SI data (Blalock and Gertler 2004, Hallward-
Driemeier and Rijkers 2010). This included correcting for invalid values, miss-
ing values, and outliers. See Hallward-Driemeier and Rijkers (2010) for details.
Summary statistics for the SI data can be found in Table 3.1. Each observa-
tion is a firm-year. Firms are on average 14.5 years old, which is different from
the average number of years of data I have for each firm, 12.4. Firms have on av-
erage 192 employees, with about 84% of them working as production workers
(as opposed to non-production, or white-collar workers). Production workers
make on average 4,261,000 rupiah/year, which is about US$506 (in year 2000
dollars). The non-production workers earn over twice as much.
Summary statistics for the IFLS data can be found in Table 3.2. The first
two columns show statistics for 1993 and the last two columns show summary
statistics for 2007. In 1993, there were 5.48 people in each household. The aver-
age age was 26.3, and 50% of the people in the sample are female. The average
person has not completed primary school, and under 30% of the sample has a
job. The average monthly per capita consumption is just under 60,000 Rupiah,
which is approximately US$ 94. About 51% of the workforce is self-employed.
The sector with the largest share of workers is agriculture, followed by manu-
facturing, wholesale, and then the public service sector. The other sectors that
are not displayed are mining, electricity, construction, transportation, finance,
and other.
In 2007, the household size increased, the average person is older, has more
education, more likely to be employed, but less likely to be self-employed, and
has a much higher per capita consumption. It is important to note that the
IFLS is a panel dataset, so the increase in average age and education are to be
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expected. The average age only increases by 5 years over the 15 year period be-
cause splits in households were followed, and new household members added
to the survey.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Market Power
The first set of results summarize the monopsonistic behavior of manufacturing
firms in the labor market5. Table 3.3 shows Pigou’s E for both production and
non-production workers. The median value of market power for production
workers is 1.93, which suggests that the median firm has significant amounts
of market power over production workers. If the firm operated competitively,
Pigou’s E would be equal to zero, as the marginal revenue product of labor
would equal the wage paid. The last three columns of Table 3.3 categorize the
distribution of market power by displaying the percentage of observations that
lie in three ranges of market power. Column (4) shows the percentage of firms
with values of Pigou’s E below 0.33, which implies that firms have little to no
market power. Column (5) has firms with measures of Pigou’s E between 0.33
and 2, which suggests that they have some market power. The value of 2 for
Pigou’s E indicates that workers’ MRPL is three times higher than their wage.
The last column is for firms with a lot of market power, having measures greater
than 2. The categories show that 40% of firms have little to no market power,
whereas 28% have some market power, and about 31% have a lot of market
5These results match those found in Brummund (this volume), and more details about the
estimation and tests of the results can be found in that paper.
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power
While the bottom half of the table shows results for non-production workers,
these results are suspect, because this approach for measuring market power
assumes that all of the workers within each category have the same level of
productivity. This is a restrictive assumption, but may be appropriate for low-
skilled manufacturing workers of the type considered in this data. However,
this assumption definitely does not hold for non-production workers, whose
category includes both management and administrative staff. For this reason,
and because the production workers comprise the vast majority of the work-
force, I will focus the rest of the analysis on the production workers.
3.5.2 Deadweight Loss
Using these measures of market power for each firm and year, the next step
in the analysis is to determine the size of the deadweight loss implied by their
monopsonistic behavior. While this value is informative, the more practical val-
ues are the predicted changes in employment and wages, ∆L and ∆W. In or-
der to find those values, the parameters of the labor demand and labor supply
curves must be estimated.
The labor demand curve is estimated by separately regressing the marginal
product of labor on the level of employment for each firm. This regression was
run 33,290 times, once for each firm in the data. The summary of the results
of these regressions are shown in the top half of Table 3.4. The average curve
is downward sloping, as theory would predict, though there is considerable
variation. The median curve is also downward sloping. 86.4% of the slope
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coefficients are statistically significant. The bottom half of Table 3.4 summa-
rizes each firm’s labor supply curve. These parameters are calculated from each
firm’s market power measurement, and their observed levels of wages and em-
ployment. Both the mean and median curves are upward sloping, which is
consistent with basic economic theory.
Using these parameters for the labor supply and labor demand curves, the
levels of employment and wages that would prevail if the firms operated com-
petitively in the labor market can be calculated. These competitive outcomes, as
well as the associated changes in each value are displayed in Table 3.5. I drop
any observations that did not have statistically significant estimates for the la-
bor demand curve, and recode any values for the change in wages and change
in labor that predicted a decrease in wages or employment to be zero. The top
half of the table displays summary statistics for the current wage, the estimated
competitive wage, and the associated percentage change in wages. The median
percentage change in wages is 72%, which says that the median worker’s wages
would increase by 72% if the manufacturing firms behaved competitively in the
labor market. The bottom half of the table presents results for employment.
The median worker works for a firm that would would hire 38% more workers
if the firm operated competitively. The percentage change for both wages and
employment are high, and suggest that manufacturing firms in Indonesia are
hiring too little cheap labor.
Table 3.6 presents the percentage change in wages and employment sepa-
rately for each major industry in the SI data. Looking at the median values
for the change in wages, the industries with the largest changes are Communi-
cation, Publishing, Tobacco, Chemicals, and Apparel. The industries with the
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smallest changes in wages are Minerals, Transportation, Leather, and Furniture.
Looking at the median values for the change in employment, the values are
much more closely bunched. The industries with the highest values are Pub-
lishing, Apparel, Communication, and Chemicals, which matches the indus-
tries with the largest changes in wages. For the most part, the industries with
the smallest changes in wages also had small changes in employment, Minerals,
Machinery, Transportation, Leather, and Tobacco.
The last step in this section is to carry over these predicted changes in wages
and employment to the individual level data, IFLS. I do that by aggregating up
the percentage changes in wages and employment to the district (kabupaten)
for each year. I take the median value weighted by the number of production
workers after restricting the sample a few ways. I ensure that all of observations
come from industries that produced valid estimates of the productions function.
3.5.3 Poverty
The previous section showed that if the firms in the manufacturing sector op-
erated competitively, there would be significant increases in both wages and
employment. This section examines how those predicted changes impact the
poverty rate in Indonesia. However, the manufacturing sector only comprised
7% in 1993 and 15% in 2007 of total employment, so we may not expect a very
large change in the overall poverty rate. As mentioned above, I calculate both
the poverty headcount ratio (P0) and the poverty gap (P1) using four different
poverty lines.
The IFLS has broad coverage, but is not nationally representative. There-
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fore, I first compare the poverty headcount ratios I calculated in the IFLS to
national poverty rates. These results are presented in Table 3.7. The first three
columns show results using the World Bank’s World Development Indicators,
and the last three columns show the results using the IFLS data. Overall, the
IFLS broadly supports the World Bank data, though there is a larger reduction
in poverty in the IFLS data. This could just be a statistical anomaly due to the
relatively small sample size, or because the regions the IFLS chose to sample
from had a greater fall in poverty than did the other regions.
Table 3.8 then displays the actual poverty headcount ratio, and three alter-
native poverty rates in 1993. The first alternative is shown in column (2), and
shows what the poverty rate would be if the existing manufacturing workers
were paid a competitive wage. Column (3) displays what the poverty rate
would be if there was a competitive level of employment, all who were paid
at the existing rate. The last column combines both the competitive wage and
the competitive level of employment. The top panel shows the poverty head-
count ratio using four different poverty lines, and the bottom panel shows the
poverty gap.
While all of the poverty lines are informative, I will focus the discussion on
the $1.25/day (PPP) poverty line, as that is the most internationally compara-
ble figure. In 1993, the poverty rate was 65%. If manufacturing workers were
paid competitively, the poverty rate would have been 57%, a 8 percentage point
reduction. If manufacturing firms hired up to the competitive level of employ-
ment, but paid them the current wage, the poverty rate would have been 60%,
a significant reduction, but not as large as the reduction associated with the in-
crease in wages. If both changes are applied, the competitive wage and level of
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employment, the poverty would have been 50% in 1993, a 15 percentage point
reduction. This is a large effect, especially considering the manufacturing sector
is a small portion of the overall workforce.
The bottom half of Table 3.8 shows the results for the poverty gap measure
in 1993. The actual measure is 0.285, and would decrease to 0.251 if the labor
market was competitive. This is a smaller absolute change than the change for
the headcount ratio. Changing to the competitive level of employment has a
similar impact on the poverty gap as does the change to the competitive wage.
This is different from the impact on the headcount ratio, though the difference
makes sense. People already employed in the manufacturing sector have a rel-
atively good standard of living, so those poor are probably close to the poverty
line, and increasing their wages will decrease the headcount ratio more so than
the poverty gap measure. However, pulling people into the manufacturing sec-
tor will have a larger impact on the lower end of the distribution, which is what
is seen in Table 3.8.
Table 3.9 shows the results for poverty in 2007. The actual poverty headcount
ratio fell from 65% in 1993 to 16.4% in 2007. This is a large change, and shows
the progress in poverty reduction that Indonesia has made over this 15 year
period. The impact of a competitive labor market in 2007 is smaller, though this
can partly be attributed to the smaller base poverty rate. If the labor market
was competitive, the poverty headcount ratio would have been 15.1%, about
a 1.3 percentage point reduction in poverty. Columns 2 and 3 show that the
competitive level of employment has a larger impact on poverty than does the
competitive wage. This result is the reverse what the relative size of the effects
in 1993. It is not surprising that the relative magnitudes changed, since there
108
was such a large change in poverty over this time period, the characteristics of
the poor in 2007 are surely different from 1993.
The results in this section show that monopsonistic behavior by manufactur-
ing firms in the labor market has been a drag on the poverty reduction progress
of Indonesia over the years 1993 to 2007. If the manufacturing firms operated
competitively in the labor market, the overall poverty rate would have been 15
percentage points lower in 1993, and would have decreased to a rate 1.3 per-
centage points lower in 2007 than did the actual poverty rate. The two different
facets of the change, competitive wages and competitive levels of employment,
had similarly sized impacts on poverty reduction.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the impact of the monopsonistic behavior of manu-
facturing firms in Indonesia on poverty. It first identified the amount of market
power each firm had by estimating each firm’s marginal revenue product of la-
bor and comparing it to the wages each firm paid. The median value of market
power was 1.93, with about 60% of the firms having significant amounts of mar-
ket power. I then calculated labor supply and labor demand curves for each firm
enabling the calculation of the optimal level of employment and wages. If man-
ufacturing firms hired labor competitively, the wages of their workers would
have increased by 72% and they would have hired 38% more workers.
The next step was to take these relative changes in wages and labor to the
IFLS dataset to enable the poverty analysis. Using the US $1.25/day poverty
line and Purchasing Power Parity exchange rates, the actual poverty rate in
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Indonesia started at 65% in 1993 and decreased to 16% in 2007. However, if
the manufacturing firms behaved competitively, the poverty rate would have
started at 50% in 1990, and decreased to 15%. These results show that the
monopsonistic behavior of firms was a drag on poverty reduction progress in
Indonesia, though less of a drag in 2007 than it was in 1993.
Changing to competitive labor markets could influence poverty through two
channels, by increasing wages or by increasing the level of employment. The
results show that each channel had a significant impact on poverty reduction,
and had similar magnitudes.
This research has several policy implications. The primary implication is
about the importance of competitive labor markets in helping reduce poverty
within a country. A labor market could be made more competitive in many
ways. One way would be to reduce the moving costs associated with workers
finding new jobs. This could be a reduction in the real physical moving costs, or
an increase in the information about other jobs, making it easier for workers to
learn about other opportunities. An increase in the number of employers would
also make the labor market more competitive, as the firms have to compete for
workers. The labor market could also become more competitive if the working
conditions at each firm were made more similar. This would reduce the differ-
ence in preferences workers have for firms, and flatten the labor supply curve
to each firm.
Another main implication of this research is about the relevance of a mini-
mum wage in Indonesia. A minimum wage policy can increase efficiency in a
monopsonistic labor market, however each firm in this analysis has a different
optimal wage level, so a minimum wage policy might be too blunt of a policy
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tool. Another policy implication is about the types of labor market policies that
have the greatest impact on poverty. While this paper considered changes in
wages and employment as a result of the elimination of monopsonistic behav-
ior, there could be a multitude of other mechanisms to generate similar changes.
This paper has shown that both channels have a similar sized impact on poverty
reduction, though attention should be given as to where the targets of the pol-
icy currently are in the income distribution as compared to the poverty line. The
relative impacts of the two channels would differ if the average manufacturing
wage is not enough to support a household above the poverty line or if the av-
erage new manufacturing worker had a much lower previous level of income.
There are also related topics that would be interesting to pursue further.
While this paper focused on poverty, market power might also influence in-
equality. Inequality would capture changes to the whole distribution of in-
comes, and not just those around the poverty line as done in this paper. It would
also be interesting to compare the the size of the deadweight loss found in In-
donesia to that of a different country.
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Figure 3.1: Labor Market Diagram with an Increasing Labor Supply Curve
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of All Indonesian Manufacturing Estab-
lishments Using the SI Data
Mean SD Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% Foreign Ownership 4.32 (18.20) 0.00 100.00
Output (bn-Rph) 19.58 (160.07) 0.00 17,769
Raw Materials (bn-Rph) 12.65 (90.36) 0.00 17,693
Investment (bn-Rph) 1.72 (92.75) 0.00 24,030
Capital Stock (bn-Rph) 18.49 (584.34) 0.00 179,044
% Output Exported 11.45 (29.28) 0.00 1,220
Value Added/Emp (mn-Rph) 22.71 (130.67) -6.84 31,486
Firm Age 14.50 (14.49) 0.00 105.00
# Employees 192.03 (653.02) 10.00 42,649
% Production Wkrs 83.84 (14.23) 1.19 100.00
% w/ HS diploma 27.38 (26.86) 0.00 192.00
% w/ College degree 1.12 (2.71) 0.00 53.33
Avg Wage-PR (th-Rph) 4,261 (2,990) 0.78 137,339
Avg Wage-NP (th-Rph) 9,491 (79,403) 0.00 34,927,880
Labor Mkt Share 0.016 (0.066) 0.000 1.000
Labor Conc. 8CR 0.253 (0.127) 0.091 1.000
Num 306,217
Notes: All values are in constant 2000 Rupiah (Rph). Data covers years 1988 -
2006. Standard deviations are in parentheses. The export data is only available for
years 1990-2000, 2004, and 2006. The education information is available for years
1995-1997, and 2006. PR stands for Production workers and NP stands for Non-
Production workers.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics of the IFLS Data
1993 2007
Mean SD Mean SD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Household Size 5.48 2.26 6.32 3.06
Age 26.28 18.85 31.13 21.02
Female 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Education 4.23 3.83 8.60 4.22
Employed 0.28 0.45 0.34 0.47
Consumption 57,850 73,491 503,915 483,513
Self-Employed 0.51 0.50 0.39 0.49
Manufacturing 0.07 0.25 0.15 0.35
Agriculture 0.14 0.34 0.35 0.48
Wholesale 0.05 0.23 0.22 0.41
Public 0.02 0.15 0.19 0.39
Num 33,081 50,526
Notes: All monetary values are nominal. Consumption is
monthly per capita consumption expenditure.
Table 3.3: Summary of Pigou’s Measure of Market Power, E
Percent of firms with
Num Mean Median E < 0.33 0.33≤ E ≤ 2 E > 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Production 241,093 5.35 1.93 40.35 28.44 31.21
Workers (0.30)
Non-Production 177,473 10.17 0.40 44.43 22.47 33.11
Workers (3.58)
Notes: Data is from the SI and covers years 1988 - 2006. Means are weighted by the number of
employees of each type in each firm. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 3.4: Summary of Estimated Labor Supply and Labor De-
mand Curves
Num Mean Std. Dev. Median
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Demand - Intercept 223,668 21,593.5 242,608.8 7,558.9
Demand - Slope 223,668 -111.52 7,826.8 -11.71
Supply - Intercept 226,209 -9,112.40 91,443.6 656.3
Supply - Slope 226,209 259.7 2,199.9 32.9
Notes: Data is from the SI and covers years 1998 - 2006. All values are in
constant 2000 Rupiah, and are weighted by the number of production
employees in each firm.
Table 3.5: Summary of Competitive Wage and Employment Levels
Num Mean 25th 50th 75th
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Current Wage 226,209 5,505.4 3,273.9 4,887.2 6,938.8
Competitive Wage 223,668 18,247.6 3,063.4 8,611.9 25,882.1
% Change W 223,668 9.58 0.00 0.72 3.64
Current Employment 226,209 1,718.0 168.0 550.0 1,352.0
Competitive Employment 223,668 2,278.5 89.2 572.3 2,016.0
% Change L 223,668 2.09 0.00 0.38 0.92
Notes: Data is from the SI and covers years 1998 - 2006. All values are in constant
2000 Rupiah and are weighted by the number of production employees in each firm.
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Table 3.6: Summary of Changes in Wage and Employment by
Industry
Wages Employment
Industry 25th 50th 75th 25th 50th 75th
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Food & Beverage 0.00 0.34 2.76 0.00 0.33 0.77
Tobacco 0.04 2.23 6.18 0.00 0.29 0.53
Textiles 0.00 0.87 3.37 0.00 0.37 0.88
Apparel 0.00 1.72 5.56 0.00 0.52 1.17
Leather 0.00 0.16 1.28 0.00 0.27 0.82
Wood 0.03 1.34 3.92 0.14 0.53 1.06
Paper 0.04 1.23 4.24 0.11 0.47 1.06
Publishing 0.65 2.99 7.55 0.21 0.66 1.35
Chemicals 0.03 1.49 8.83 0.04 0.47 1.03
Plastics 0.00 0.54 2.42 0.00 0.42 0.98
Minerals 0.00 0.02 0.42 0.00 0.23 0.83
Metals 0.17 0.96 2.51 0.22 0.46 0.74
Fabricated Metals 0.00 0.45 2.59 0.00 0.35 0.86
Machinery 0.00 0.35 2.81 0.03 0.34 0.71
Electrical 0.00 0.14 1.98 0.00 0.18 0.74
Communication 0.00 2.37 12.86 0.00 0.49 1.23
Vehicles 0.00 0.07 1.22 0.00 0.28 0.81
Transport 0.00 0.08 0.45 0.00 0.22 0.41
Furniture 0.00 0.29 1.53 0.00 0.34 0.83
Notes: Data is from the SI and covers years 1998 - 2006. All values are in
percentages and are weighted by the number of production employees
in each firm.
Table 3.7: Comparing Poverty Rates in IFLS to National
Poverty Figures
World Development
Indicators IFLS Data
1993 2007 Diff 1993 2007 Diff
Poverty Line (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
$1.25/day 0.54 0.24 0.30 0.65 0.16 0.48
$2.00/day 0.85 0.56 0.29 0.83 0.39 0.44
National 0.18 0.17 0.01 0.18 0.13 0.04
Notes: All IFLS calculations use sampling weights. 1 The WDI
poverty rate using the National poverty line was not available
in 1993. The closest available year is 1996, which is the number
shown.
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Table 3.8: Summary of Poverty Rates in 1993, Using Multiple Poverty
Lines
Comp. Comp. Both
Actual Wage Employment Comp.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Poverty Headcount Ratio
National 0.177 0.153 0.152 0.134
$1.25/day (PPP) 0.648 0.567 0.595 0.497
$2.00/day (PPP) 0.828 0.749 0.806 0.673
$1.25/day (real) 0.817 0.738 0.796 0.663
Poverty Gap
National 0.052 0.045 0.046 0.041
$1.25/day (PPP) 0.285 0.251 0.251 0.218
$2.00/day (PPP) 0.460 0.408 0.427 0.361
$1.25/day (real) 0.448 0.397 0.415 0.350
Notes: Data is from IFLS. All figures use sampling weights.
Table 3.9: Summary of Poverty Rates in 2007, Using Multiple Poverty
Lines
Comp. Comp. Both
Actual Wage Employment Comp.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Poverty Headcount Ratio
National 0.134 0.127 0.127 0.124
$1.25/day (PPP) 0.164 0.157 0.155 0.151
$2.00/day (PPP) 0.387 0.365 0.360 0.348
$1.25/day (real) 0.490 0.459 0.462 0.438
Poverty Gap
National 0.075 0.073 0.073 0.072
$1.25/day (PPP) 0.083 0.081 0.080 0.080
$2.00/day (PPP) 0.156 0.149 0.147 0.144
$1.25/day (real) 0.204 0.193 0.192 0.186
Notes: Data is from IFLS. All figures use sampling weights.
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